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[P]artnership in crime ... presents a greater potential threat
to the public than individual delicts. Concerted action both
increases the likelihood that the criminal objective will be
successfully attained and decreases the probability that the
individuals involved will depart from their path of crim-
inality. Group association for criminal purposes often, if
not normally, makes possible the attainment of ends more
complex than those which one criminal could accomplish.
. . . Combination in crime makes more likely the commis-
sion of crimes unrelated to the original purpose for which the
group was formed.
Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter'
What is needed . . . are new approaches that will deal not
only with individuals, but also with the economic base
through which those individuals constitute such a serious
threat to the economic well-being of the Nation. . . . [A]n
attack must be made on their source of economic power itself,
and the attack must take place on all available fronts.
Senator John L. McClellan'
INTRODUCTION
The law of conspiracy has seldom been in good repute among
the practicing bar.3 Too much of its time has been spent in defending
the great malefactors of wealth and power-tainted politicians, cor-
rupt corporate officers, faithless union bosses, and mob figures. Per-
sonal interest has always had a way of shaping perspective, and the
rich and powerful are, after all, paying clients. In addition, law pro-
fessors do not like the law of conspiracy.' The prevailing ideology
of academic life is too liberal to support any legal tool that strengthens
the hand of the prosecutor, although it must be conceded that table
talk in the dining room was strangely ambivalent when the law of
1. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961). But see D. CREssEY,
THEFT OF THE NATION 67 (1969) (criminal justice system designed to control
individual violator not organizations).
2. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969).
3. See, e.g., Goldstein, The Krulewitch Warning: Guilt by Association, 54
GEo. L.J. 133 (1965); Klein, Conspiracy-The Prosecutor's Darling, 24 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 1 (1957).
4. Professor Johnson goes so far as to suggest that it be abolished. Johnson,
The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CAL. L. REv. 1137 (1973). But see
Blakey, Aspects of the Evidence Gathering Process in Organized Crime Cases:
A Preliminary Analysis, in THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME 80
(1967) [hereinafter referred to as TASK FORCE]. Professor Blakey stated: "The
utility of conspiracy theory in the prosecution of organized crime is manifest. No
other single substantive legal tool has been as effective in bringing organized crime
to book." Id. at 81.
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conspiracy was used to bring the Watergate defendants to book.5
Eminent judges, too, have added their voices to the general thrust
of criticism directed at it, 6 yet the law of conspiracy has survived and
prospered since its uncertain origins in the fourteenth century,7 prob-
ably because it has been, up until now, society's chief legal answer to
a pressing need in the law to respond to the special challenge of group
crime. If the law of conspiracy is in good repute among any segment
of the bar, it is among the prosecutors. The conspiracy charge has
been aptly called by Judge Learned Hand, "the darling of the modern
prosecutor's nursery." 8 Were Judge Hand alive today, he might be
moved to comment, however, that the fickle fancy of the prosecutor
has turned to RICO, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions title 9 (title IX) of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970."0
Largely ignored at first, today RICO is widely employed by federal
prosecutors, not just by organized crime strike force attorneys, but
by prosecutors in United States Attorney's offices; RICO is used not
just in organized crime prosecutions," but in white-collar crime prose-
5. See, e.g., Ehrlichman v. Sirica, 419 U.S. 1310 (1974) ; United States v.
Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933, rehearing
denied, 433 U.S. 916 (1977) ; United States v. Mardian, 546 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir.
1976); United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ; United States v.
Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1976) ; United
States v. Chapin, 515 F.2d 1274 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1015 (1975);
United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1013
(1975) ; United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Mitchell v. Sirica,
502 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 955 (1974) ; United States v.
Mitchell, 389 F. Supp. 917 (D.D.C. 1975), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933, rehearing
denied, 433 U.S. 916 (1977).
6. The classic statement of judges who have criticized the law of conspiracy was
authored by Mr. Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in Krulewitch v. United
States, 336 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1949) ("elastic, sprawling and pervasive offense"
constituting "a serious threat to fairness in our administration of justice"). Those
who have followed have only copied the statement; they have not improved upon it.
Since the law of conspiracy has been almost wholly a judge-made doctrine, there is
a certain irony to the prevailing adverse judicial attitude.
7. See Blakey, TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 81.
8. Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925). There is more
than a little irony, too, in Judge Hand's making this comment since the contours
of the modern federal law of conspiracy are in many ways his handwork. See, e.g.,
United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944); United States v. Zeuli,
137 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1943); United States v. Mack, 112 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1940);
United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938). But see United States v.
Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 688-90 (1975), in which the Supreme Court questioned the
soundness of Judge Learned Hand's conclusion in United States v. Crimmins, 123
F.2d 271, 273 (2d Cir. 1941). Judge Hand concluded that to permit conspiratorial
liability when the alleged conspirators were ignorant of the federal implications of
their acts would expand the scope of the conspiratorial agreement beyond its terms
as understood by the participants in the conspiracy. See generally Developments
in the Lau-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REv. 920 (1959).
9. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976).
10. Pus. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §1961
(1976)).




cutions (most prominently political corruption cases) 12 as well as in a
large variety of violent offenses. The result of this heightened prose-
cutive activity has not been surprising. Like the law of conspiracy
when it alienated the rich and the mighty, RICO has now become a
favorite target of complaints voiced in the press by defense attorneys. 3
Obviously, those of us who designed and drafted RICO, as well as
12. See, e.g., United States v. Marubeni, 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980) (prosecu-
tion of Japanese corporation for bribery of Alaskan purchasing agent); United
States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976), aff'd in part and vacated in
part, 591 F.2d 1347, aff'd on rehearing, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 1647 (1980). For a critique of the Mandel litigation that is sharply
condemnatory, see 3 CORNELL INSTITUTE ON ORGANIZED CRIME, MATERIALS ON
,RICO 1213 (1980-1981) [hereinafter referred to as MATERIALS].
13. William G. Hundley, a prominent Washington defense counsel (his clients
have included former Attorney General John Mitchell), has been quoted: "But
they're using this [RICO] against all kinds of defendants. You know as well as I
do that Congress never would have passed it if they ever thought they were going
to use it against governors and people like that." Are Prosecutors Going Wild
Over RICO, Legal Times of Wash., Oct. 8, 1971, at 32, col. 1. Defense attorney
Stanley S. Arken of New York has called RICO "cruel." George Collins of
Chicago has called its draftsmen "brilliant," but the statute "totalitarian." In
Pursuit of the Mob, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 26, 1979, at 12, col. 3. Sherman Magidson
of Chicago has said, "RICO can reach out and castrate people." RICO The
Enforcer, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 20, 1970, at 83. "It's like the death sentence," according
to Harvey M. Silets of Chicago. "If a RICO count is in the indictment, unless you
work a [plea bargaining] deal, you are really courting the danger of losing not only
your liberty but your business as well." Racketeering Law Facing Key Test,
Nat'l L.J., Dec. 29, 1980, at 18, col. 1. The potential for abuse "is not fanciful. It's
there," added Stephen Horn of Washington. Id. at 18, col. 2. "It's like using a
cannon to go hunting for squirrels," said Barry Tarlow of Los Angeles. "The
way it has been applied and the threats to apply it involve a gross violation of
individual rights and liberties." Id. at 18, col. 3.
As it can be seen from these comments, most of the objections of the defense
bar to RICO boil down to noting a possibility of abuse, something that can be said
of all statutes, not just RICO. As such, they should be listened to, but not given
undue attention. Administrative abuse is an incident of administration; it is not
necessarily caused by poor statutory draftsmanship, and its cure usually lies in
careful selection of administrative personnel, not more legislation. No one has
convincingly shown, moreover, that RICO's draftsmanship peculiarly makes it
subject to abuse. At best, the case can be made that not all marginal cases that
fall within its terms warrant its enhanced sanctions. But that, too, is true of all
statutes, and that is where sound prosecutorial discretion and the good sense of trial
judges come into play. Not all possible cases have to be prosecuted, and not all
possible penalties have to be imposed. In addition, there are legitimate provisions in
RICO for remission or mitigation of its mandatory forfeiture sanction, where its
impact might be too severe. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1976). Finally, the Criminal
Division of the Department of Justice, on January 16, 1981, issued "RICO Guide-
lines." These guidelines, while somewhat opaque, emphasized the need for a "RICO
purpose" (enhanced sanction, forfeiture, and the like) in bringing a RICO indictment.
The guidelines recognized that a RICO count in an indictment should not be merely
cumulative and that the inclusion of a RICO count in an indictment to enhance the
prosecutor's power in plea bargaining was impermissible. The guidelines were also
sensitive to the federal-state balance that must be struck when the predicate offenses
are solely state crimes. Given common sense in their interpretation and application,
the new guidelines should go a long way toward meeting much of the legitimate
criticism leveled at RICO.
Although the American Bar Association approved RICO when it passed
Congress in 1970, see Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S. 30 Before the
Subcomm. No. 5, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 538 (1970)
(statement of Edward L. Wright, President of ABA) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings on S. 30], the Bar Association now has a study group compiling "recom-
mendations" for amendments to RICO. See [1979] 26 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA)
2282; ABA SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF
RICO AND MAIL FRAUD CASES (1980).
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those in whose custody its administration has been entrusted, ought
not be above criticism, whatever its source. Yet, as Judge Learned
Hand said of criticism of the judiciary: "Let . . . [us] be severely
brought to book, when . . . [we] go wrong, but by those who will
take the trouble to understand." 1"
RICO was the end product of a long process of legislative effort
to develop new legal remedies to deal with an old problem: "organized
crime." 15 As finally enacted, RICO authorized the imposition of
enhanced criminal penalties and new civil sanctions to provide new
legal remedies for all types of organized criminal behavior, that is,
14. L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 85 (Dilliard ed. 1952). He also noted,
"Perhaps it is also fair to ask that before the judges are blamed they should be
given credit of having tried to do their best." Id. at 110.
15. "Organized crime" is a phrase with many meanings. It is much like the
fictional crime portrayed in Akira Kurasawa's 1950 film, Rashoman, in which a
ninth-century nobleman's bride is raped by a bandit, and the nobleman lies dead.
The film portrays versions of the double crime from the perspectives of each of the
three participants and a witness. Each version is different. So it is with the
definition of organized crime. Some have seen nothing and decided that nothing
was there. See, e.g., Hawkins, God and the Mafia, 14 PUB. INTEREST 24 (1969).
Others, examining the phenomenon from an anthropological perspective, have seen
a "social system." See, e.g., F. IANNI, A FAMILY BUSINESS (1972). One com-
mentator, relying on press accounts, has seen only a public relations gimmick. See D.
SMITH, THE MAFIA MYSTIQUE (1975). The organizational theorist sees a functional
division of labor. See D. CRESSEY, supra note 1. Some lawyers have seen it as a
conspiracy. See, e.g., Blakey, TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 80, 81-83. The Presi-
dent's Crime Commission in 1967 adopted a view that termed conspiratorial behavior
"organized crime" when its organizational sophistication reached a level where divi-
sion of labor included positions for an "enforcer" of violence and a "corrupter" of
the legitimate processes of our society. Id. at 8. The particular organized crime
syndicate known as the Mafia was termed only the "core" of organized crime; it
was not identified with it. Id. at 6. The tendency of some to identify organized
crime with the Mafia has been decried by no less than the sponsor of the Organized
Crime Control Act, Senator John L. McClellan. GAMBLING IN AMERICA: REPORT
OF THE COMMISSION ON THE REVIEW OF NATIONAL POLICY TOWARD GAMBLING
181-82 (1976) ("in none of the hearings or in the processing of legislation in which
I have been involved has the term been used in this circumscribed fashion"). That
other ethnic groups are deeply involved in organized crime on both the syndicate
and enterprise level seems evident. See PENNSYLVANIA CRIME COMMISSION, 1980
REPORT: A DECADE OF ORGANIZED CRIME 18-20 ("Black Mafia" in Philadelphia).
Indeed, the concept of "enterprise criminality" that RICO embodies-whether
organized crime, white-collar crime, or violent crime generally--owes its origin to a
seminal paper prepared by Professor Donald R. Cressey. TASK FORCE, supra
note 4, at 25. See also id. at 56-60 for a discussion of the key concepts of "organi-
zation" plus "crime." For a further breakdown of the concept into "syndicate,"
"enterprise," and "venture," see ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS RELATING TO WIRETAP-
PING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 190-92 (1976). However the phrase is defined,
the scope of the Organized Crime Control Act was not limited to the operations of
"organized crime." See, e.g., 116 CONG. REc. 35344 (1970) (statement of Rep. Richard
Poff). Congressman Poff was a principal House sponsor of the legislation. See also
United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 365 (9th Cir. 1975) ; United States v.
Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41, 44-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ; United States v. Vignola, 464
F. Supp. 1091, 1096 (D. Md. 1979). Compare United States v. Thordarson, 487
F. Supp. 991, 999 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (to be applied conservatively beyond organized
crime). When Congress wanted to limit a provision of the Act, it knew how to
use appropriate words. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, PUB. L. No.
91-452, §601, 84 Stat. 934-35 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §3503 (1976)) (deposi-




enterprise criminality-from simple political corruption to sophisti-
cated white-collar crime schemes to traditional Mafia-type endeavors.
In addition, RICO restored to American jurisprudence a limited con-
cept of criminal forfeiture of ill-gotten gains and economic bases of
misused power. Civil suits were also authorized, which may be
brought by the Attorney General of the United States "0 or by in-
jured persons against RICO violators.17  The remedies made avail-
able in civil actions brought by the Attorney General were injunctive
relief is and, in a private RICO suit, not only injunctions and other
forms of civil relief, but treble damages plus costs and a reasonable
attorney's fee.'" As such, RICO's promise of new legal relief for old
wrongs was great. We are only now discovering whether all that
RICO promised in 1970 will be redeemed in the years ahead.
This article will present a brief overview of the legislative his-
tory of RICO and its structure, including its standards and basic
concepts. The article will then consider the criminal sanctions au-
thorized under RICO and discuss specific aspects of the RICO civil
suit as well as some of the problems that may be expected to arise in
it. The objective of the article is to provide the reader with a short
introduction to RICO, one of the most sophisticated statutes ever
enacted by Congress.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 2o
In 1951, the Kefauver Committee disclosed the problem of or-
ganized crime's infiltration into legitimate business."' By 1960, the
problem of criminal infiltration of labor unions had been documented
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) (1976).
17. Id. § 1964(c).
18. Id. § 1964(b).
19. Id. § 1964(c).
20. For a more comprehensive analysis of the legislative history of RICO, see
1 MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 58-105.
21. "One of the most perplexing problems in the field of organized crime is
presented by the fact that criminals and racketeers are using the profits of organized
crime to buy up and operate legitimate business enterprises." S. REP. No. 141, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1951). The list of industries noted included advertising, amuse-
ment, appliances, automobile, baking, ballrooms, bowling alleys, banking, basketball,
boxing, cigarette distribution, coal, communications, construction, drug stores,
electrical equipment, florists, food, football, garment, gas, hotels, import-export,
insurance, juke box, laundry, liquor, loans, news services, newspapers, oil, paper
products, radio, real estate, restaurants, scrap shipping, steel, surplus, television,
theaters, and transportation. S. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 170-81 (1951).
"In most cases, these are enterprises in which gangster methods have been used to
obtain monopolies so that their vicious practices taint otherwise legitimate business
They are able to compete unfairly with legitimate businessmen because of
their accumulations of cash and their vicious methods." S. REP. No. 2370, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1950).
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by the McClellan Committee. 22  Then, the McClellan Committee ex-
posed the structure of the national syndicate of organized crime known
as the Mafia or La Cosa Nostra.23  The problem of organized crim-
inal activity in the world of legitimate businesses and unions was, there-
fore, well-documented by 1967 when the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice reported the methods
used by organized crime to acquire control of business concerns 24
and recommended the use of new approaches to control its infiltration
into legitimate business.2
In 1967, bills 2048 2' and 204927 were proposed in the Senate
to implement aspects of the Commission's recommendations by apply-
22. See generally the following reports of the Senate Select Committee on
Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field: S. REP. No. 1784, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) ; S. RP. No. 621, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) ; S. Rrs,.
No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). See also Organized Crime and Illicit Traffic
in Narcotics: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the
Comm. on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
23. S. REP. No. 72, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). See Hearings Before the
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 271-78
(1966) (statement of J. Edgar Hoover) ; Organized Crime and Illicit Traffic in
Narcotics: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the
Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-35 (1963)
(statement of Robert F. Kennedy).
24. The Commission reported:
Control of business concerns has usually been acquired through one
of four methods: (1) investing concealed profits acquired from gambling
and other illegal activities; (2) accepting business interests in payment of
the owner's gambling debts; (3) foreclosing on usurious loans; and
(4) using various forms of extortion.
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADM. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE
OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIrY 190 (1967).
25. "Law enforcement is not the only weapon that governments have to control
organized crime. Regulatory activity can have a great effect . . . . Government
at various levels has not explored the regulatory devises available to thwart the
activities of criminal groups, especially in the area of infiltration of legitimate
business." Id. at 208. In support of its recommendation, the Commission noted
the easier civil standard of proof, the possibility of discovery, and the value of
antitrust-type remedies. Id. It was this insight that was the origin of the two-
tract approach-criminal and civil-of RICO.
26. S. 2048, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). S. 2048 proposed an amendment to
the Sherman Act prohibiting the investment or business use of unreported income:
Every person who (1) invests directly or indirectly any intentionally
unreported income derived by such person from a proprietary interest in
any business enterprise in any pecuniary interest in any other business
enterprise engaged in or affecting trade or commerce among the several
states, with foreign nations, or within any place subject to the provisions
of section 3, or (2) uses any such income to establish or operate any such
other business enterprise, shall be fined not more than $50,000, or imprisoned
for not more than one year or both.
Id. § 8. The bill's sponsor, Senator Roman L. Hruska, hoped to bring the full force
of the Sherman Act to bear on organized crime:
The antitrust laws now provide a well-established vehicle for attacking
anticompetitive activity of all kinds. They contain broad discovery pro-
visions as well as civil and criminal sanctions. These extraordinarily broad
and flexible remedies ought to be used more extensively against the
"legitimate" business activities of organized crime.
113 CONG. REc. 17999 (1967) (remarks by Sen. Hruska upon introduction of S. 2048).
27. S. 2049, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). S. 2049 was drafted to supplement
the Sherman Act amendments proposed by S. 2048. It prohibited: (1) the
19801 RICO
TEMPLE LAW QUARTERLY
ing antitrust-type remedies to certain activities of organized crime.
Both bills were referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,2" but
no action was taken on either bill. The proposed bills, however, were
studied by the private bar. The Antitrust Section of the American
Bar Association analyzed Senate bills 2048 and 2049 and agreed
with them in theory but not in form.29 The Section recommended
that antitrust-type bills attacking criminal infiltration of business be
independent criminal statutes.31 Concern was expressed that a com-
mingling of the two distinct statutory purposes might produce in-
harmonious results and methods. 1 An independent statute, it was
suggested, would also free the new criminal remedies from the restric-
tive case law appropriate for the primarily regulatory antitrust set-
ting."2 The Section considered that in the areas of "standing" and
acquisition of an interest in a business affecting interstate commerce with income
derived from listed criminal activities, id. § 2(1); and (2) the agent of a cor-
poration from authorizing the corporation to engage in any of the listed criminal
activities, id. at § 3. The bill allowed the government, as well as third parties, to
seek injunctions to restrain violations of S. 2049, id. at §4(b)-(c). Actions for
damages and cost were made available to the government, id. at §5(b), and actions
for treble damage costs and attorneys' fees were made available to the victims, id.
at § 5(a). S. 2049 also provided a full range of liberal procedural provisions.
Congressman Poff introduced companion bills to S. 2048 and S. 2049 in the
House. H.R. 11766 and H.R. 11268, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REc. 17976
(1967).
28. 113 CONG. REc. 18007 (1967). For an analysis of other procedural aspects
(lesser included offenses, venue, joinder, severance, and verdict) of RICO, see 3
MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 1377-1477.
29. See House Hearings on S. 30, supra note 13, at 149. The American Bar
Association Antitrust Section testified:
The Antitrust Section agrees that organized crime must be stopped.
It further agrees that the antitrust machinery possesses certain advantages
worthy of utilization in this fight. It therefore supports and endorses the
principles and objectives of both S. 2048 and S. 2049, and similar
legislation.
However, it prefers the approach of S. 2049. By placing the anti-
trust-type enforcement and discovery procedures in a separate statute, a





32. Id. The Antitrust Section also testified:
Moreover, the use of the antitrust laws themselves as a vehicle for
combating organized crime could create inappropriate and unnecessary
obstacles in the way of persons injured by organized crime who might
seek treble damage recovery. Such a private litigant would have to con-
tend with a body of precedent-appropriate in a purely antitrust context-
setting strict requirements on questions such as "standing to sue" and
"proximate cause."
Conversely, the placing of this legislation in the body of the antitrust
laws could have an undesirable and inappropriate impact on the adminis-
tration of the antitrust laws in their normal context. Thus, faced with
litigation between private citizens and members of the organized criminal
hierarchy, there may well be a natural inclination to weigh the balance
heavily in favor of the private citizen. Such an imbalance, while de-
fensible in this context, is inappropriate in the normal antitrust litigation
context.
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"proximate cause," more liberal standards might be desirable in the
new actions where the primary focus would be organized crime."
In 1969, Senator John L. McClellan, in response to his long-
standing interest in organized crime, introduced Senate bill 30,34
which was based on a number of the recommendations of the Presi-
dent's Crime Commission." The Organized Crime Control Act was a
broad-based reform bill covering such areas as grand juries,3 e im-
munity, 7 contempt,3" false statements,39 depositions,40 and sentencing
for dangerous special offenders. 4' When Senate bill 30 was first
introduced, it did not contain comprehensive RICO-type provisions.
Also in 1969, Senator Hruska introduced Senate bill 1623 42 which
combined the concepts of Senate bills 2048 and 204941 introduced
previously. As a product of the Senate hearings on Senate bills 30
and 1623, Senate bill 1861,4 RICO's immediate predecessor, was
drafted and introduced by Senators McClellan and Hruska4 Senate
bill 1861 enlarged the range of listed "racketeering activities" (re-
ferred to as "criminal activity" in previous bills) and required the
proscribed conduct be accomplished through a "pattern" of racketeer-
ing activity. Victim treble damage and injunctive actions were not
dealt with explicitly in the new bill in an effort to streamline it and
sidestep a variety of complex legal issues, as well as possible political
problems in trying to process legislation that expressly created a va-
33. Id.
34. S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 769 (1969).
35. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADM. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967).
36. S. 30, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 39906 (1969) (tit. I).
37. Id. (tit. II).
38. Id. (tit. III).
39. Id. (tit. IV).
40. Id., 115 CONG. Rzc. at 39906-07 (tit. V).
41. Id., 115 CONG. REC. at 39907 (tit. X). It was, in short, the legal dimension
of "integrated package" that the President's Crime Commission had called for.
TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 24.
42. The Criminal Activities Profits Act, S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115
CONG. REc. 6995-96 (1969).
43. 115 CONG. REC. 6993 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Hruska upon introduction of
S. 1623).
44. The Corrupt Organizations Act of 1969, S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115
CONG. REC. 9568-9571 (1969).
45. "The bill which I am introducing today, the Corrupt Organizations Act of
1969, is in part a product of testimony developed in four days of hearings on S. 30."
115 CONG. REC. 9567 (1969) (remarks of Sen. McClellan upon introduction of
S. 1861). Hearings on S. 30 were combined with hearings on S. 1623 and other
bills. See Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings on S. 30, S. 974,
S. 975, S. 976, S. 1623, S. 1624, S. 1816, S. 2022, S. 2122 and S. 2292 Before the
Subcom. on Criminal Laws and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 268 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings on S. 30].
While RICO had its origins in previous attempts to curtail organized crime infiltra-
tion into legitimate business, S. 1861, when redrafted and introduced, had a broader
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riety of both public and private remedies. 6 On the other hand, Senate
bill 1861 strengthened Senate bill 1623 by providing civil investiga-
tive demands, 47 use immunity,4" criminal forfeitures,49 and a congres-
sional mandate for liberal construction.5  These and other organized
crime-related measures were referred to the Subcommittee on Criminal
Law of the Senate Judiciary Committee.51 A variety of witnesses
offered recommendations touching on aspects of RICO: its immunity
provisions,52 its scope,5" its definitions,54 and its potential threat to the
civil liberties of defendants.55 Incorporating some, but not all, of
purpose; it was directed at all forms of "enterprise criminality." It represented the
rest of the Crime Commission's integrated package.
46. See S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 9569 (1969). S. 1861's
congressional findings and Statement of Policy, for example, explicitly recognized
that it carried with it a range of remedies that included "fine, imprisonment, criminal
forfeiture, and civil divestiture, dissolution, injunctions and other relief . ... "
(emphasis added). It is likely, therefore, that a private cause of action would have
been implied. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
47. S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 9570-71 (1969).
48. Id., 115 CONG. Rc. 9569-70 (1969).
49. Id., 115 CONG. Rac. 9569 (1969). As originally drafted, forfeiture was
limited to an "interest in any enterprise." As reported out and passed, the for-
feiture provisions were expanded to include "any interest acquired," i.e., ill-gotten
gains, as well as the base of control over the enterprise. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a)
(1976). See note 117 infra for a further discussion of forfeiture.
50. S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §4, 115 CONG. REc. 9571 (1969).
51. S. Res. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 6925 (1969); S. Res.
1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 9512 (1969).
52. The American Bar Association, for example, preferred tranaction over use
immunity. Senate Hearings on S. 30, supra note 45, at 268.
53. The Department of Justice, for example, suggested that the investor be
required to have been a principal in the criminal activity and be allowed minimal
investment of illegal monies. Id. at 406.
54. Clarification of the concepts of "pattern of racketeering activity" and
"racketeering activity" was also suggested by the Department of Justice. Id. at 405.
55. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), for example, expressed its
disapproval of the RICO provisions through a series of general attacks. The
ACLU claimed that mandatory open proceedings in government civil actions and
the use of civil investigative demands against natural persons violated the Fifth
Amendment and the defendant's right of privacy. Senate Hearings on S. 30, supra
note 45, at 477. More importantly, the ACLU recognized that RICO applied
beyond organized crime in the traditional sense of the Mafia-type crime, and it
expressed concern that the RICO provisions would infringe upon the civil rights
of white-collar and political activist defendants. Id. at 475. Congressman Poff
ably answered this last civil liberty objection during the floor debate in the House:
The curious objection has been raised to S. 30 as a whole, and to several
of its provisions in particular, that they are not somehow limited to
organized crime-as if organized crime were a precise and operative legal
concept, like murder, rape or robbery. Actually, of course, it is a functional
concept like white-collar or street crime serving simply as a shorthand
method of referring to a large and varying group of individual criminal
offenses committed in diverse circumstances.
Nevertheless, this line of analysis has a certain superficial plausibility.
But if we make a closer examination we see that it is seriously defective in
several regards. Initially, it confuses the occasion for reexamining an
aspect of our system of criminal justice with the proper scope of any new
lesson derived from that reexamination. For example, our examination of
how organized crime figures have achieved immunity from legal account-
ability led us to examine the sentencing practices and powers of our
Federal courts. There we found that now our Federal judges, unlike
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-these recommendations, the Judiciary Committee integrated Senate
bill 1861 into Senate bill 30 as title IX of the re-drafted bill. Im-
munity was provided in title II of Senate bill 30; it was dropped
from title IX.56 The definition of "racketeering activity" was broad-
,ened and clarified to include more specific types of conduct.5 Sim-
ilarly, the definition "pattern of racketeering activity" was limited by
requiring at least two acts, one of which must have occurred after
the effective date of the law.5" Participation of the investor as a
principal in the racketeering activity was required and minimal in-
vestment allowed without assessing additional penalties.59 This re-
vised version of Senate bill 30 6o was passed by the Senate almost
unanimously 61 and sent to the House.62
State judges, have no statutory power to deal with organized crime leaders
as habitual offenders and give them extended prison terms. Having noted
the lack of habitual offender provisions by considering one class of cases,
we obviously learned that it was lacking in other classes, too. Is there
any good reason why we should not move to meet that need across the
board?
[M]ost disturbingly, however, this objection seems to imply that a
double standard of civil liberty is permissible. S. 30 is objectionable on
civil liberties grounds, it is suggested, because its provisions have an
incidental reach beyond organized crime. Coming from those concerned
with civil liberty in particular, this objection is indeed strange. Have they
forgotten that the Constitution applies to those engaged in organized crime
just as it applies to those engaged in white-collar or street crime? S. 30
must, I suggest, stand or fall on the constitutional questions without regard
to the degree to which it is limited to organized crime cases.
116 CONG. REc. 35344 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff). Almost identical remarks
were made in the Senate by Senator McClellan, 116 CONG. Rnc. 18913-14 (1970).
Congressman Poff's remarks, it should be emphasized, identified the most common
-mistake in reading RICO: the confusion of one aspect of the occasion for its
enactment (organized crime) with the scope of its provisions (enterprise criminality).
RICO was broadly drafted to reach a wide variety of problems that were identified
in the Committee's examination of organized crime. Those problems were not
limited to organized crime cases and neither was the statute. For a detailed
rejoinder, see McClellan, The Organized Crime Control Act (S. 30) or Its Critics:
Which Threatens Civil Liberties? 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55 (1970).
56. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 926-928
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976)). Title II was sustained against con-
stitutional objections under the Fifth Amendment in Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441 (1972).
57. House Hearings on S. 30, supra note 13, at 50-51 (1970).
58. Id. at 52. The concept was not defined in the text of the bill, but the
Committee Report indicated it meant "not isolated." S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 158 (1969) ("continuity plus relationship").
59. House Hearings on S. 30, supra note 13, at 53-54. Since the generation of
black money, i.e., illegal profits, was prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), it was not
thought necessary to impose additional penalties on their investment under 18
U.S.C. § 1962(a) unless control was also obtained.
60. The reach of S. 30 beyond organized crime was retained over the dissent
of Senators Hart and Kennedy. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 215 (1969)
(individual views of Senators Hart and Kennedy).
61. The vote in the Senate was 73 to 1. 116 CONG. REc. 972 (1970).
62. Upon receipt, the House sent S. 30 to the Committee on the Judiciary.
116 CONG. REc. 1103 (1970).
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In the House, many bills parallel to Senate bill 30 were intro-
duced, and while the House generally agreed with the purpose of
Senate bill 30, it did not always agree with the details of its drafts-
manship. 3 Most of the amendments made to Senate bill 30 by the
House Judiciary Committee circumscribed its scope. Excluding the
addition of a treble damage action, all of the House's changes limited
Senate bill 30. The statutory definitions of "unlawful debt" " and
"pattern of racketeering activity" 65 were narrowed. The continuing
offense clause added by the Senate Judiciary Committee was deleted
by the House as unnecessary language. Mandatory open proceed-
ings in government civil suits were replaced with broad court dis-
cretion." A number of amendments were offered to Senate bill 30 on
the House floor, but all were defeated or withdrawn. 7
63. H.R. 19215, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REc. 31914, and H.R. 19586,
91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REc. 35242 (1970), for example, paralleled the
RICO sections of the Senate version of S. 30, except in their inclusion of private
civil actions. H.R. 19586 provided for private treble damage actions, but it did not
explicitly resolve any of the subsidiary legal issues. H.R. 19215 was much more
complete, expressly providing for private injunctive and treble damage actions and
governmental actual damage actions. H.R. 19215 also provided for government
intervention in private suits, a five-year statute of limitations, and automatic tolling
during governmental actions. The language of RICO as enacted into law is
identical to the language of H.R. 19586, but it contained none of the subsidiary
provisions of H.R. 19215. It is unfortunate that H.R. 19215, the more complete
bill, was not used by the House amendment drafters in making changes in S. 30.
64. Debts from legal gambling, even if unenforceable, were removed from
RICO's prohibitions against collection of debts. Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6) (1976)).
65. "Pattern of racketeering activity" was limited, requiring both acts to have
occurred within ten years. Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§1961(5) (1976)).
66. Pub. L 91-452, 84 Stat. 944 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1967 (1976)). In
addition to the objections to S. 30 that led to the changes made in S. 30, see notes
64-65 supra and accompanying text; other concerns were raised during the hearings
which did not command a majority of the Committee. Committee dissenters felt
that the forfeiture provisions were unwise and envisioned difficulty for the courts in
interpreting racketeering activities in terms of potentially conflicting state sub-
stantive definitions. H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 186-88 reprinted in
[1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4007-91. The American Bar Association
majority suggested that "pattern of racketeering activity" should require three acts.
House Hearings on S. 30, supra note 13, at 556, 558-60. According to the ACLU,
civil investigative demands directed against natural persons raised Fifth Amendment
difficulties, id. at 500, while the New York Lawyers Association worried about
protecting innocent persons. Id. at 402. The Association of the Bar of the City
of New York reiterated the continuing issue of S. 30's scope beyond organized
crime. Id. at 370.
67. An amendment establishing penalties for malicious treble damage actions,
introduced by Congressman Mikva, was defeated, 116 CONG. REC. 35342 (1970), as
was an amendment introduced by Congressman Biaggi to outlaw being a member
of "organized crime." Id. at 35343. An amendment was also offered to clarify
aspects of the treble damage action added by the Judiciary Committee, id. at 35346,
but the amendment was withdrawn by its sponsor, Congressman Sam Steiger, at
Congressman Poff's suggestion, id., as the bill was being processed under an informal
agreement among the Judiciary Committee members to oppose all floor amendments.
Withdrawal, rather than defeat, was desirable to avoid creating an unfavorable
legislative history on the ideas contained in the amendment, most of which were
supported by Congressman Poff.
Efforts to clarify some of the possible interpretation problems raised by the
language of the House amendments to RICO occurred in the Senate, but not in
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On October 12, 1970, the Senate received Senate bill 30 as
amended by the House. The basic structure and scope of the bill had
been preserved. Because of the approaching end of the session of Con-
gress and the upcoming elections, the Senate decided to concur with
the House version of Senate bill 30 without asking for a conference "'
in order to avoid the possible death of a much-needed bill. 9 The
.President signed Senate bill 30 into law on October 15, 1970.70
II. STRUCTURE OF RICO
A. Standards
RICO makes unlawful, that is, contrary to law,' four activities
by any person:
(1) using income derived from a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity to acquire an interest in an enterprise; 72
the House. In the 92d Congress, Senators McClellan and Hruska introduced S. 16.
Victims of Crime: Hearings on S. 16, S. 33, S. 750, S. 1946, S. 2087, S. 2426,
S. 2748, S. 2856, S. 2994, and S. 2995 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and
Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1972).
S. 16 would have assured private injunctive actions and provided for federal damage
actions in addition to setting a specific civil statute of limitations. S. 16 was
reported favorably from the Judiciary Committee, S. REP. No. 1070, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1972), and unanimously passed, 118 CONG. REc. 29379 (1972). Even when
S. 16 was incorporated into the amended Senate version of H.R. 8389, 118 CONG.
REC. 31054-56 (1972), the House took no action on it. In the first session of the
93d Congress, the Senate considered and passed S. 13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 119
CONG. Rac. 10319 (1973). Senate bill 13 of the 93d Congress was identical in
relevant portions to S. 16 of the 92d Congress. The House referred S. 13 to
committee where it died, 119 CONG. REc. 10592 (1973), "not . . . [because of] a
lack of support for the bill but . . . [because of] the committee's heavy work
load." N.Y. Times, May 5, 1974, § 1, at 69, col. 3.
68. 116 CONG. Ric. 36296 (1970).
69. The Senate received S. 30 from the House on October 12, 1970, two days
before the election recess and only 29 working days before the end of the session.
See 116 CONG. Rlc. 36280-37264 (1970).
70. 116 CONG. REc. 37264 (1970). In 1969, the President had indicated his
support for the use of antitrust-type provisions against organized crime, as well as
a number of the bill's other provisions; therefore, his signature on the bill was
expected. See President's Special Message to the Congress on a Program to
Combat Organized Crime in America, 1969 PUB. PAPERs 315, 320-21 (Apr. 23, 1969).
71. RICO is not a criminal statute; it does not make criminal conduct that
before its enactment was not already prohibited, since its application depends on
the existence of "racketeering activity" that violates an independent criminal statute.
In addition, its standards of unlawful, i.e., criminal or civil, conduct are sanctioned
by both criminal and civil remedies. RICO, in short, is a "remedial" statute.
PUB. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970) ("remedial purposes"). See
generally Note, RICO and the Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REV.
167 (1980) for an excellent discussion of history and rationale of the liberal con-
struction directive. Nevertheless, RICO has been sustained against constitutional
objection under the double jeopardy clause, United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298,
309 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980) (state robbery conviction,
RICO not precluded) and for alleged multiplicity. 609 F.2d at 306-07; United States
v. Boylan, 620 F.2d 359, 361 (2d Cir. 1980).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or
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(2) acquiring or maintaining an interest in an enterprise through
a pattern of racketeering activity; 73
(3) conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity; "' and
(4) conspiring to commit any of these offenses.75
An understanding of these legal standards requires a look at the basic
concepts used in their drafting.
B. Concepts 76
1. Person
Section 1961(3) indicates that "person" "includes . . . any indi-
vidual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in
property." 77 This definition is an illustration; it does not limit the
through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated
as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code,
to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the
proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establish-
ment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities
of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities
on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention
of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting
another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the secu-
rities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate
family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity
or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in
the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class,
and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more
directors of the issuer.
Section 1962(a) has only been used in one reported case. United States v. McNary,
620 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1980). In McNary, the statute received a liberal con-
struction, and illicit funds were traced into an investment in a business which was
then forfeited. Id. 628-29.
73. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain,
directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
74. 18 U.S.C. §1962(c) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct
of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or
collection of unlawful debt.
75. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1976) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person
to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this
section." For a comprehensive analysis of what state of mind should be implied in
assessing responsibility under RICO, see 3 MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 1286-1331.
76. See 1 MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 106-19 for the original version of this
discussion of RICO concepts.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1976).
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concept.78  Those "persons" who can violate RICO include white-
collar criminals 79 as well as members of organized crime."0
2. Enterprise
To violate RICO, a person must acquire or maintain an interest
in or control of an enterprise,8 ' or must conduct or participate in the
conduct of an enterprise's affairs.8 2 Section 1961(4) provides that
"enterprise" "includes any individual, partnership, corporation, asso-
ciation, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact though not a legal entity." " Here, too, the defini-
tion works by illustration, not by limitation. 4 Private businesses
as well as labor organizations are enterprises under RICO.' The
78. "Includes" is generally a term of enlargement, not of limitation. Highway
& City Freight Drivers v. Gordon Transps., Inc., 576 F.2d 1285, 1289 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1002 (1978); American Fed'n of Television and Radio
Artists v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 887, 889-90 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ; Argosy Ltd. v. Hennigan,
404 F.2d 14, 20 (5th Cir. 1968); Federal Power Comm'n v. Corporation Comm'n,
362 F. Supp. 522, 544 (W.D. Okla. 1973), aff'd, 415 U.S. 961 (1974). It was so
used in RICO. See United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 394 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1085 (1980) ("enterprise" illustrative not exhaustive).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1018-19 (D. Md.
1976), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), af'd on rehearing, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir.
1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1647 (1980) (Governor of Maryland).
80. See e.g., United States v. Gambino, 566 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1976). The concept of "enterprise" is not uncon-
stitutionally vague. See United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 305 (7th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980) (although broad in scope, statute is not
vague) ; United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 478-79 (5th Cir. 1976) (statute does
not violate due process). The concept of enterprise-or separate entity-is not,
moreover, new to the law; it is reflected in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence that
holds the privilege against self-incrimination inapplicable to corporations, Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 51 (1906), unions, United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 704
(1944), and some partnerships, Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974)
(three-person law partnership more than "an informal association or a temporary
arrangement for the undertaking of a few projects of short-lived durations"). Note,
however, that an enterprise may also be an individual, that is, a sole proprietorship
under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976).
82. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976). Under this subsection, the person must be
employed by or associated with the enterprise, and the enterprise must be engaged
in interstate commerce or its activities must affect interstate commerce. The effect
on commerce must be alleged, United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535, 545 (5th
Cir. 1979) (allegations sufficient) and shown beyond a reasonable doubt, United
States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836, 852-53 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951
(1978) (failure to prove), although its impact need only be slight. United States
v. Malatesta, 583 F.2d 748, 754-56 (5th Cir. 1978), af'd on rehearing, 590 F.2d
1379 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 962 (1979) (long-distance
phone calls).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 394 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1085 (1980). For a discussion of the term "includes," see note
78 supra.
85. See, e.g., United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979) (legitimate restaurant serving as front for narcotics
trafficking); United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 909 (1979) (auto dealership) ; United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d
595 (7th Cir. 1978) (beauty college) ; United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127
(3d Cir. 1977) (bail bond agency) ; United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir.
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enterprise need not be legitimate."6 Government agencies may also be
enterprises.8 7 In addition, the definition of enterprise encompasses
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975) (foreign hotel and gambling casino);
United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (theater) ; United
States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978) (labor union). For a general analysis of
entity liability under RICO, see 3 MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 1145-80.
86. The business being infiltrated or conducted may be illegitimate as evidenced
by the following circuit court decisions. D.C. Circuit: United States v. Swiderski,
593 F.2d 1246, 1248-49 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979) ("enter-
prise" applies to illegitimate businesses). Second Circuit: United States v. Huber,
603 F.2d 387, 393-96 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1085 (1980) (RICO not
unconstitutionally vague and can be applied toward illegal enterprises; however,
court cautioned against undue prosecutorial zeal in invoking RICO); United States
v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977)
(exempting illegal enterprises from RICO would leave loophole). Third Circuit:
United States v. Provenzono, 620 F.2d 985, 993 (3d Cir. 1980) (association formed
for the sole purpose of racketeering satisfies "enterprise" requirement). Fourth
Circuit: United States v. Whitehead, Nos. 78-5160 to 78-5162 (4th Cir. Mar. 20,
1980). Fifth Circuit: United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535, 545 (5th Cir. 1979)
(robbery, murder and narcotics group); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978) (court would "deny society the pro-
tection intended by Congress were it to hold that the Act does not reach those
enterprises nefarious enough to diversify their criminal activity") ; United States
v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064, 1073 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978)
(prostitution ring) ; United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978) (police taking bribes); United States v. Morris, 532
F.2d 436, 442 (5th Cir. 1976) (cheating at cards); United States v. Hawes, 529
F.2d 472, 478-79 (5th Cir. 1976) (gambling). Seventh Circuit: United States v.
Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 305 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980)
(RICO not limited to include only legitimate business) ; United States v. Cappetto,
502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975) (statutory
language and legislative history of RICO would include within its reach an illegal
enterprise actually connected with a legitimate billiards hall). Cappetto was extended
by United States v. Winstead, 421 F. Supp. 295, 296 (N.D. Ill. 1976), in which
the court held that § 1964 could be invoked to prevent or restrain illegal enterprises
not otherwise connected with legitimate business. Ninth Circuit: United States v.
Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 568, 569 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980)
("enterprise" has a "broad and unrestricted use" which includes illegal enterprises).
The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979)
held contrary to the other circuits, but the case was reversed after an en bane
rehearing on December 3, 1980. United States v. Sutton, Nos. 78-5134 to 78-5139,
78-5141 to 78-5143 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 1980). See note 91 infra for a detailed
discussion of Sutton.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Grant, 622 F.2d 308, 313 (8th Cir. 1980) (county
judge) ; United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065, 1067 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 836 (1978) (warden of county prison) ; United States v. Frumento, 563
F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978) (Bureau of Cigarette
and Beverage Taxes) ; United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978) (law enforcement department); United States v.
Ohloon, 552 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977) (law enforcement department) ; United
States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd, 605 F.2d 1199 (3d'
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072 (1980) (Philadelphia Traffic Court).
In United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976), the court held
that Congress did not intend a state government to be included in the definition of
enterprise. Id. at 1022. The Third Circuit disagreed with this holding in United
States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072'
(1978). In Frumento, the court stated that Congress intended to prevent the
infiltration of organized crime into all areas of economic life, not only into private
business. Id. at 1090-91. The Fourth Circuit in unrelated decisions explicitly re-
jected the holding of Mandel. See United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5, 7 (4th
Cir. 1980) (narrow interpretation of RICO rejected) ; United States v. Baker, 617
F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir. 1980) (definition of "enterprise" includes public entities).
In addition, the legislative history indicates that Congress was aware of the role
of government, through corruption and bribery of officials, in facilitating other illegal
activities. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1969). It is clear that
Mandel was wrongly decided.
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associations in fact. This type of enterprise need not be a legal entity;
RICO is directed at groups of individuals informally organized for
a common purpose. Associations in fact are often formed for the
purpose of engaging in criminal activities,"" but their purposes may
be legitimate as well. 9 The group associated in fact may also change
its membership in the course of its activity. ° Courts continue to
disagree, however, as to the proper construction and scope of the
"enterprise" concept."
88. See, e.g., United States v. Clemones, 577 F.2d 1247, modified, 582 F.2d
1373 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1313 (1980) (prostitution
ring) ; United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1039 (1977) (gambling); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975) (gambling). Such illegitimate associations. are
in fact usually connected with § 1962(c) violations. See United States v. Elliott,
571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978) in which the court held:
"There is no distinction, for "enterprise" purposes, between a duly formed cor-
poration that elects officers and holds annual meetings and an amoeba-like infra-
structure that controls a secret criminal network." 571 F.2d at 898.
89. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969). Legitimate
associative groups are often enterprises infiltrated in § 1964(b) violations.
90. United States v. Clemones, 577 F.2d 1247, 1253 (5th Cir. 1978), modified,
582 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1313 (1980). The key is
"community of interest and continuing core of personnel." United States v. Con
Errico, No. 80-1255 (2d Cir. Dec. 1, 1980).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3531 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1981) (No. 80-808); United States v.
Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260
(6th Cir. 1979), rev'd on rehearing, Nos. 78-5134 to 78-5139, 78-5141 to 78-5143
(6th Cir. Dec. 3, 1980) (en banc). Because the Sutton panel's opinion misconstrued
RICO and its legislative history, it merits close analysis. The "enterprise" before
the panel was an association in fact engaged in offenses involving drugs, mail fraud,
stolen property, and firearms. Because the panel felt that the government's con-
struction of "enterprise," which would have included such an association, read the
concept out of the statute by drawing no distinction between "enterprise" and
"pattern of racketing activity," the panel declined to adopt it. The panel also relied
on its reading of the statute's legislative history, which it found to reflect a single
purpose: to prohibit the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime.
Under the panel's analysis, therefore, Congress did not try to attack organized
crime directly. In addition, the panel felt supported in its construction of "enterprise"
by the existence in 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976) of an investment exemption. Since
§ 1962(a) apparently dealt only with legitimate business, so, too, should § 1962(b)
and (c). The panel did not find the "liberal construction" directive of RICO
inconsistent with its result. See Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452,
§ 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970). Instead, it felt that the traditional approaches of
"lenity" and "federal state balance" rather than liberal construction should be
followed.
The panel's holding was wrong and appropriately reversed for a number of
reasons. First, it ignored the title of RICO. See United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S.
(2 Cranch) 358 (1804) (Marshall, J.) (title relevant in construing statute);
C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.12, at 37 (4th ed. 1973).
Title IX was, after all, entitled "Racketeer Influenced (legitimate) and Corrupt
(illegitimate) Organizations." The development of the language of the title, more-
over, shows that it reflects precisely this distinction. As noted above, see note 42
.supra and accompanying text, RICO had its origin in S. 1623, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969), 115 CONG. REc. 6995-96 (1969), which was entitled, "The Criminal Activ-
ities Profits Act." Senate bill 1623 was clearly aimed at sterilizing "black money,"
that is, prohibiting the use of illegal profits to invest in legitimate business. But
S. 1623 was subsequently redrafted, enlarged, and reintroduced as S. 1861, which
-was entitled "The Corrupt Organization Act," 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), 115
CONG. REc. 9512 (1969). As discussed at note 45 supra and accompanying text,
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the focus of S. 1861-enterprise criminality-was not as narrow as that of S. 1623,
Yet, its title was ambiguous: a "corrupt organization" could be, for example,
either the mob itself or a union taken over by it. When the Committee reported it
out, title IX was, therefore, retitled as it is now, clarifying the ambiguity and
drawing the crucial distinction explicitly.
Second, the panel's opinion confused evidence with the element of the offense
that the evidence was offered to prove. Merely because one item of evidence may
be introduced to prove two elements, it does not follow that only one element is being
shown. For example, in a prosecution for assault with intent to rape, a showing
that the defendant pushed a woman to the ground and ripped off her sweater would,
of course, be sufficient to establish assault; it could also be used to infer intent to
rape. Because the same evidence was used to establish both elements, it does not
follow that there is no difference between assault and assault with intent to rape.
See United States v. Short, 4 C.M.A. 437, 444, 16 C.M.R. 11, 18 (1954). Sim-
ilarly, RICO requires a finding of both an "enterprise" and a "pattern of racketeer-
ing activity." See McClellan, supra note 55, at 144. But, because the evidence that
establishes the "pattern" may also establish the existence of the "enterprise," it does
not follow that there are not two distinct elements. In some cases, of course, the
evidence that establishes one will also establish the other, but not necessarily.
Compare United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980) (insufficient
evidence of pattern also to infer enterprise) with United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d
804, 834 (5th Cir. 1980) (evidence of pattern may be used to show conspiracy).
For example, an association in fact may be organized to engage in a pattern of
intrastate theft and prostitution. The pattern of theft and prostitution could be
used to infer the existence of an "enterprise." Yet, it could not be used to
establish a "pattern of racketeering" since neither intrastate theft nor prostitution
is "racketeering activity" under 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1). When two or more murders
are added, the RICO offense may be made out if they are not isolated events.
McClellan, supra note 55, at 144. Here, it is clear that there is a distinction in
what the statute requires as elements of the offense and what might be inferred
from the evidence. See also United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 907 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978), in which the Fifth Circuit found that
Elliott had in fact engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity but that his
conduct was not part of the affairs of the enterprise, which was established by
other evidence. In short, the concept "enterprise" focuses on a group of people;
it asks, did an entity engage in the crime? The concept "pattern" focuses on the
relationship between acts of racketeering; it asks were the crimes committed by
the entity isolated or related?
Third, the panel misread the statute's purpose. The purpose of RICO was
explicitly stated on the face of the statute.
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in
the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence
gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing
enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful actions of
those engaged in organized crime.
18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976). See Schwegmann v. Calvert Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395
(1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) (statute, not legislative history, voted on and
signed). Nor can it be convincingly suggested that this statement and the findings
that come before it only apply to other titles of the 1970 Act since they appeared in
substantially the same form in S. 1861, the predecessor of title IX. For an
example of this kind of fallacious reasoning, see Note, Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act: An Analysis of the Confusion in Its Application and a
Proposal for Reform, 33 VAND. L. REv. 441, 474 (1980).
Consequently, the panel ignored the plain meaning of the statute (it says "any"
enterprise), see note 112 infra, its statement of purpose (new sanctions), as well
as the liberal construction directive, see United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 105
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977), and looked to the legislative
history in an effort to construct the panel's own version of the purpose of the
statute. Once there, it read statements of purpose that were illustrative as if they
were exhaustive. It is true that one purpose of title IX was to deal with the
infiltration of legitimate business, but such statements are incomplete. Nowhere
in the legislative history does it say that the legislative history was intended to be
exhaustive or that this purpose was the only purpose. In short, the panel read
"only" into the legislative history and then used that as a justification for reading
"legitimate" into the statute itself. The panel, in effect, heedlessly rewrote a
"carefully crafted statute." Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 789 (1975).
It is, of course, proper for a court to read another court's opinion in light of the
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facts that gave rise to the controversy, but a legislature is not a court; its law-
making powers are not limited to the occasion that gave rise to its consideration
of a problem. Congress is perfectly free to write a statute broader than that
occasion. The infiltration of legitimate business, moreover, was only one of the
occasions for title IX's enactment, and that single aspect of its legislative history
ought not be used to confine narrowly the scope of what Congress finally voted on
and the President signed. That scope ought to be derived from the language of the
statute and its statutory statement of its purposes, not just a single thrust of part
of its legislative history. Congress properly went to the heart of the problem-
enterprise criminality in all of its forms-and attacked it directly.
Fourth, while the panel's reading of § 1962 (a) was correct, it did not logically
follow that § 1962(c), or other aspects of § 1962(a), had to be so limited. There
is nothing inconsistent about seeing, for example, that "enterprise" in § 1962(a)
would be limited for the purpose of the exclusion to a legitimate enterprise, buthave a different meaning in another context. What of an investment of "black
money" in an illegitimate enterprise? Why could that not violate § 1962(a) without
regard to the exclusion? It is the exclusion, and not the prohibition of § 1962 (a), in
short, that is so limited. See 116 CONG. Rxc. 844 (1970) (discussion by Senators
McClellan, Magnuson, and Hruska concerning illegal funds from one state being used
in illegal activities in another). See Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 13
(1978) (sponsors' statements entitled to great weight).
Fifth, the panel misunderstood the meaning of the liberal construction directive.
RICO is not a criminal statute; section 1962 says "unlawful" not "criminal." See
note 71 supra. In fact, RICO does not draw the line between innocent and criminal
conduct, since it requires the violation of two or more independent criminal statutes
before it is violated. Consequently, concern with lenity has no place in its con-
struction. That is why Congress made all of title IX subject to it. But see United
States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 905 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W.
3531 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1981) (No. 80-808).
Finally, concern over federal-state balance is legitimate, but it is a matter that
is best handled by the Congress and prosecutive discretion. A court should not
rewrite a clear federal statute because it would strike the balance otherwise or
because a marginal prosecution is brought. See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S.
37, 43-45 (1979) (Section 1962 not construed narrowly despite federalism concerns).
See note 13 supra for comment on prosecutive guidelines.
Unfortunately, the Sutton panel's decision has begun to poison the well, andits effects have been felt in other circuits, chiefly in United States v. Turkette, 632
F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3531 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1981)
(No. 80-808) and United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980), each
of which, for that reason, merits close analysis.
In Anderson the Eighth Circuit held that "enterprise" was a concept distinctfrom "pattern." Consequently, it reversed a RICO conviction despite a showing
that two defendants engaged in a pattern of racketeering, to wit, fraud. While the
holding of Anderson is unexceptional, it continued the confusion between the con-
cepts of "enterprise" and "pattern" initiated by the Sutton panel. Had Anderson
held that, although there was a showing of a "pattern," the evidence was insufficient
to infer the existence of an "enterprise," that is, a separate entity as opposed to
just two individuals acting together, it would occasion no further comment; it
would be only an example of an unwise prosecution on the facts, not the advocacy
by the prosecution of an unsound legal theory. Unfortunately, the court apparently
assumed that it faced a choice between Sutton and the line of cases from other
Circuits, noted above, that were in conflict with it, and the court seemingly came
down on the side of the Sutton panel. The court's opinion also contains unwise and
unnecessary language on issues such as legislative purpose, liberal construction, and
federal-state balance. Read narrowly, Anderson was correctly decided, at least as a
factual matter. The thrust of the opinion, however, suggests a hostility toward the
use of RICO against illicit associations in fact as a matter of law. Given a more
attractive factual showing, it may be hoped that the Eighth Circuit would realign
itself with the other circuits and reject the Sutton panel's approach.
In Turkette the First Circuit followed the Sutton panel; it held that RICO
did not apply to an association in fact that engaged in a pattern of racketeering, to
wit, drugs, arson, arson fraud, and bribery. The court felt that § 1962(a) and (b)
made sense only if read to apply to legitimate business. Consequently, § 1962(c) had
to be similarly limited. In addition, the court applied the concept ejusdem generis-
to reach this result. It also followed the Sutton panel's reasoning on the relation
between the concepts of "pattern" and "enterprise." The court suggested that its
construction was supported by the legislative history and commentary by Senator
McClellan. The court further suggested that a broad construction of §§ 1961 to,
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1968 would undermine 18 U.S.C. § 1955, a provision enacted as title VIII of the
Organized Crime Control Act, as well as Comprehensive Drug Abuse, Prevention
and Control Act of 1970. The opinion echoed Sutton-like comments on liberal
construction of "enterprise" and noted that its reading of RICO would not leave
the crimes unpunished since they would remain violations of the independent statutes
prohibiting the predicate offenses.
All of the reasons just noted to reject the holding of the Sutton panel apply
equally to Turkette. Additional reasons may be set out. First, the court in
Turkette misunderstood the definitions in § 1961. As noted above, some of them
define with words of limitation. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1976) ("means").
Others, however, define by illustration. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) & (4)
(1976) ("includes"). As such, they are definitions that enlarge, not restrict the
word defined. See notes 77 & 78 supra and accompanying text.
Second, the Turkette court viewed the civil sanctions as somehow necessarily
limited to injunctions against legitimate enterprises. Yet the Senate Report itself
in discussing the civil sanctions used injunctions against a bawdy house, (Clopton v.
State, 105 S.W. 994 (Tex. 1907), and a gambling house, (Respass v. Commonwealth,
131 Ky. 807, 813, 115 S.W. 1131, 1132 (1909), to illustrate how RICO's operation
would be consistent with traditional equity principles. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 79 n.9 & 81 n.11 (1969). Although legislative history focused on the
infiltration of legitimate businesses and unions, nowhere does it say that this was
title IX's only purpose, and there is ample language in the Senate Report, as well
as elsewhere, that reflects an awareness of the broader scope of title IX. See, e.g.,
S. REP. No. 617, supra, at 78-79 ("frontal attack on the subversion of our economy
by organized criminal activities"; "attack must be made . . . on all available fronts").
Third, the misuse of Senator McClellan's law review article is unfortunate.
While it focused, as did the Committee Report, on the infiltration of legitimate
businesses and unions, the article never suggested that that was the only purpose
of title IX. In fact, in setting out the background of title IX, the Senator, as did
the Committee Report, reviewed a variety of organized crime business activities-
hardly legitimate-including theft from brokerage houses and the business of
dealing in stolen and counterfeit credit cards. See McClellan, supra note 55, at
143. Consequently, when the Senator summarized the scope of title IX as em-
bracing an "interstate business" that engages in a "pattern" of violations, he could
not justifiably be understood to have had only legitimate business in mind, but must
be understood to have meant any of the "commercial activities of organized crime."
Id. The Senator was explicit, too, when he noted that injunctions against "the
mob" were contemplated. Id. at 142. It must be conceded, however, that the
legislative history could be clearer-the Report as well as Senator McClellan's
article. Nevertheless, Congress voted on, and the President signed, the statute, not
the Report or the article. See Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 374 (1956)
(when legislative history is doubtful, go to the statute). The statute alone is the
law. The statute is what is supposed to be clear and it is. See Schwegmann Bros.
v. Calvert Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). See generally Note, RICO: Are the Courts
Construing the Legislative History Rather Than the Statute Itself? 55 NOrsE
DAME LAw. 777 (1980).
Fourth, the Court's attempt to construe RICO with other statutes was laudable,
but misguided. Title 18 is not a code, but a compilation; it is, in fact, inconsistent
and overlapping. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1952 with 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (both deal with
use of interstate facilities, yet § 1084 has exceptions that § 1952 does not). Until
title 18 is codified, such reasoning will lead to bad, not good results. It is worth
noting, too, that the pending codification of title 18 does not follow the Sutton panel.
S. RaP. No. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 777 n.31 (1977).
Fifth, in suggesting that its construction of "enterprise" renders the independent
offenses still criminal, the Turkette court ignored the result that the new remedies of
title IX-criminal forfeiture, injunctions, and general civil relief, including treble
damages-will not be applicable to these offenses when they are committed as part
of the affairs of an illicit enterprise. Three examples make the point vividly.
Assume that: (1) the mob tells the owner of a coin-operated machine business that
it will now exact, as a price for permitting the business to continue to operate in
its area, a tribute and then backs up its demand with a series of threats: pay or
else; (2) the mob tells the owner of a similar business that it is now a full partner
with him in his business, and then backs up its demands with a series of threats:
pay or else; or (3) the mob, which has its own coin-operated machine business,
tells the owner of a similar business to stay out of its territory or to cut back on
its present territory, or else. Would anyone seriously suggest that the owner of the
business would feel that the courts had done their job in construing title IX if he
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3. Pattern of Racketeering Activity
To violate RICO, the takeover or operation of an enterprise must
be accomplished through a "pattern" of "racketeering activity." Sec-
tion 1961 (5) limits "pattern" by requiring that it include "at least
two acts . . . , one of which occurred after the effective date of this
chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years . ..after the
commission of a prior act." 92 Beyond this statutory limitation, the
legislative history of RICO as well as its judicial interpretation
indicate that the racketeering acts must be "related" to each other."
were told that title IX prohibited examples (2) and (3), but not example (1)?
That is what the Sutton panel's opinion and the First Circuit's opinion in Turkette
would require.
In light of the explicit title of the Act as well as the statement of purpose and
the plain language of title IX, it will not be the Congress that will have failed to
use the right words, but the courts that will have failed to read them properly if the
Sutton panel and the Turkette court prevail in their interpretation of RICO. As
noted above, the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc has now reversed the panel's holding
in Sutton, six to four. In a masterful opinion by Chief Judge George Edwards,
the full court found "no reason" to support the panel's "strained construction" of
title IX in the "language [of the statute] itself, nor . .. in its legal history .... -
Consequently, the court "decline[d] the appellant's invitation to emasculate Title
IX. . . ." Nos. 78-5134 to 78-5139, 78-5141 to 78-5143 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 1980).
In dissent, Judge Merritt, the author of the panel's opinion, noted that the number
of RICO prosecutions was rising rapidly, commented on the need for "certainty in
the work-a-day world of conducting criminal trials," and observed that the issue
of RICO's proper construction "await[ed] authoritative resolution by the Supreme
Court." Id.
Lastly and ironically, it must be noted that some district courts expressed a
hostility toward applying RICO to a legitimate business. See Barr v. WUI/TAS,.
Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), in which Judge McMan held that
Congress did not intend to include leitimate businesses, such as A.T. & T., in the.
definition of enterprise. In May 1979, Judge Sterling dismissed a RICO count
against five Texans accused of an oil swindle, stating, "RICO was designed to keep
racketeers out of business, not to make racketeers out of businessmen." NEWSWEEK,
Aug. 20, 1979, at 83. Neither Judge McMan nor Judge Sterling read the statute
correctly. There is nothing in RICO that says that, if legitimate businessmen act
like racketeers, they should not be treated like racketeers.
92. 18 U.S.C. §1961(5) (1976). The effective date is October 15, 1970. The.
requirement that one act occur after the effective date avoids the prohibition against
ex post facto laws. See United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978)
(acts both before and after statute) ; S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158
(1969). The last act must be within the statute of limitations. Related to the.
ex post facto issue is the objection that a RICO charge was made to avoid the
impact of a state or federal statute of limitations. In United States v. Forsythe,
560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977), the Third Circuit held that a RICO charge was
proper, even though the state statute of limitations had run on the predicate offenses.
since they played no more than a definitional role in RICO. See also United States
v. Malatesta, 583 F.2d 748, 757-58 (5th Cir. 1978), off'd on rehearing, 590 F.2d
1379 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 962 (1979) (statutory reference.
to state law does not invoke state statute of limitations but merely defines offense) ;
United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065, 1066-67 (3d Cir. 1978) ("chargeable under
state law" means chargeable at time of offense, not time of indictment) ; United
States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1371 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 801 (1978) (the crime is intended to be treated as-
continuing over a prolonged period; statute runs from date of last offense).
93. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969).
94. See United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd,.
527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976) ("pattern" should
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Sporadic activity cannot constitute a pattern of racketeering activity.
"The racketeering acts must have been connected with each other by
some common scheme, plan, or motive so as to constitute a pattern
and not simply a series of disconnected acts." 11 The acts may be
unrelated to each other, but held together by a relationship to an en-
terprise." Patterns have been found where the separate acts have had
similar purposes,97 results,9 participants," victims,' ° or methods of
commission.' Under section 1961 (1), "racketeering activity" is
be construed as requiring more than accidental or unrelated instances of proscribed
behavior). To establish a "pattern" of "racketeering activity," two related acts,
not two separate but related schemes must be shown. United States v. Weather-
spoon, 581 F.2d 595, 601-02 (7th Cir. 1978). See also United States v. Parness, 503
F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975) (several separate, but
related acts part of single scheme to take over foreign corporations). In addition,
the affairs of the enterprise must be conducted "through" the racketeering activity.
See, e.g., United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 951 (1978) (RICO indictment dismissed when no link between gambling and
mobile home business shown).
95. United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 527
F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976). See also United States
v. White, 386 F. Supp. 882, 883 (E.D. Wis. 1974) ("pattern" suggests a greater
interrelationship among the acts than simply commission by the same person). But
.see United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 60-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d
1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978) (Congress may define "pattern"
as commission of two acts within a specified period even though the acts would not
constitute a pattern as the term is usually understood). See also United States v.
Kaye, 556 F.2d 855, 860-61 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 921 (1977) (related
acts over four-year period established pattern).
96. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899 (5th Cir. 1978). But see United
States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("pattern" should be
construed as requiring more than accidental or unrelated instances of proscribed
behavior). Elliott, not Stofsky, was decided correctly. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969) (need only be not isolated). For an excellent discussion
of "pattern" and the various cases, see United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118,
1121-23 (2d Cir. 1980).
97. United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'd on other
,grounds, 49 U.S.L.W. 4022 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1980) (activity included multiple acts of
arson and use of mails to defraud insurance company); United States v. Clemones,
577 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir.), modified, 582 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 100
S. Ct. 1313 (1980) (activity involved interstate transportation of prostitutes and
establishment of prostitution business) ; United States v. Burnsed, 566 F.2d 882 (4th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1077 (1978) (police accepted money and services of
prostitutes in return for protection of illegally operated clubs and gambling
establishments).
98. United States v. Nacrelli, 468 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd, 614
F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1980) (mayor involved in protection racket for gambling
activities).
99. United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1976) (defendants engaged
in several card games to defraud tourists over 19-month period).
100. United States v. Chavanec, 467 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (one victim
defrauded six times).
101. United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978) (five acts
of mail fraud) ; United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 921 (1977) (shop steward received money from employer for four and
one-half years); United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977) (repeated
solicitation and acceptance of bribes to protect gambling, prostitution, and illicit
manufacture, distribution, and sale of whiskey); United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d
237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied 429 U.S. 819 (1976) (officials of trade union
accepted payments from employers).
[Vol. 53
defined by incorporating state and federal offenses. Here the defini-
tion limits; it does not merely illustrate. The word used is "means,"
not "includes." The state offenses are generically defined. Arson,
bribery, and extortion are among the incorporated state crimes.
10 2
Many federal statutes are incorporated under RICO as well. Mail
fraud 10' is the most inclusive of the federal statutes,' 4 since it covers
a broad range of criminal activity rooted in fraud.
4. Liberal Construction
RICO is to be "liberally construed to effectuate its remedial pur-
poses." '0' With few exceptions," 6 the courts have faithfully fol-
lowed this congressional directive in applying RICO in both civil and
criminal proceedings. In criminal actions, courts have liberally con-
strued "enterprise," 107 "racketeering activity," 108 as well as RICO
as a whole.' 9 Congress believed that the normal practice of following
a policy of strict construction or the implementation of a policy of
.102. 18 U.S.C. §1961(1)(A) (1976). Other state crimes are murder, kid-
napping, gambling, robbery, and dealing in narcotics. Id.
103. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976). See 1 MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 120-153 for
an analysis of RICO and mail fraud. Security fraud is also considered in 1
MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 154-210. The best student note on mail fraud is
Comment, Survey of the Law of Mail Fraud, 1975 U. ILL. L.J. 237.
104. 18 U.S.C. §1961(1)(B)-(D) (1976) also includes federal bribery and
wire fraud statutes, among others.
105. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976). For a general analysis of how the courts have
treated this provision, see 3 MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 1213-85; Note, RICO and
the Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 167 (1980).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976), in
which the court held: "While Congress may instruct courts to give broad inter-
pretations to civil provisions, it cannot require courts to abandon the traditional
canon of interpretation that ambiguities in criminal statutes are to be construed in
favor of leniency." 415 F. Supp. at 1022. Sce also United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d
1065 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978), in which the majority construed
§1961(1) (a) liberally, but the concurring opinion emphasized the criminal nature of
the action and stated that the language must be strictly construed. Id. at 1069. For
a discussion of Mandel, Sutton, Anderson, Turkette, and Marubeni, see notes 87 & 91
supra, note 117 infra. See also Note, RICO: Are the Courts Construing the
Legislative History Rather Than the Statute Itself? 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 777
(1980).
107. United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979) ; United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880, 899 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1021 (1978) ; United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977) ; United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d
430, 439 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975) ; United States v.
Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091, 1095 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd, 605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072 (1980) ; United States v. Frumento, 405 F. Supp.
23, 29-30 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
108. United States v. Salinas, 564 F.2d 688, 691 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 951 (1978).
109. United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1135-36 (3d Cir. 1977) ; 'United
States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977) ;
United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 439 n.12 (2d Cir. 1974) ; cert. denied, 419




leniency 110 was inappropriate in the context of RICO, since RICO did
not draw a line between criminal and innocent conduct."' Instead,
RICO authorized the imposition of different criminal or civil remedies
on conduct already criminal, when performed in a specified fashion.
Once the policies of strict construction or leniency had been imple-
mented in the construction of the underlying "racketeering activity,"
and the line had been crossed into the sphere of criminality, it was
inappropriate to further restrict the scope of the statute by reapplying
these policies. Absent application of the constitutional void for
vagueness doctrine,' 12 the policy Congress properly mandated for the
110. See generally Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Criminal Statutes, 48
HARV. L. REv. 748 (1935).
111. See, e.g., Mr. Justice Holmes in McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25
(1931) :
Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of
the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning
should be given to the world in language that the common world will under-
stand of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make
the warning fair, so far as possible, the line should be clear.
Id. at 27.
112. See, e.g., Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on tke Punishment
of Crimes of Status, Crimes of Ge-neral Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police
Officers and the Like, 3 CRIM. L. BuLL. 205 (1967) ; Note, The Void-For-Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960). In light of these
considerations, it is all the more ironic that some courts, ignoring the plain meaning
of the liberal construction directive, have set out to rewrite the statute, most often
by misusing its legislative history. The courts are, after all, supposed to give effect
to the intent of Congress, and in doing so, the first reference should be to the "literal
meaning of the words employed." Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63, 65 (1958).
If the words are "sufficient in and of themselves to determine the purpose of the
legislation" plain meaning controls. United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310
U.S. 534, 543 (1940). There is no need to refer to legislative history where the
statutory language is clear. Gemsco Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 260 (1945).
Going to legislative history may, in fact, not bring into focus meaning, but may pull
the matter "into a fog in which little can be seen if found," United States v. Public
Utilities Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 320 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). Indeed, the
legislative history may be "more vague than the statute." Ozawa v. United States,
260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922). Only when literal meaning is "plainly at variance with
the policy of the legislation as a whole" should purpose rather than literal words be
followed. United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. at 543. When
faced with an argument that meaning is at variance with purpose, the traditional,
and proper, approach has been to follow the so-called "Mischief Rule," well stated
by Sir Edward Coke:
IT]he office of all the Judges is always to make such . . . construction as
shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle
inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief . . . , and to add
force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the
makers of the Act, pro bono publico.
Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Ex. 1584). Such a traditional approach
ought to have resolved the enterprise-as-illicit-association-in-fact issue easily,
particularly in light of the liberal construction directive. Moreover, for the courts
to suggest, despite its plain meaning, that the liberal construction directive itself is
limited to the civil aspects of RICO, in the total absence of any legislative history
support whatsoever, demonstrates that it is not the policy of Congress, but the
policy of the individual judges that is being implemented. The directive plainly
states: "The provision of this title shall be liberally construed .... .. " Pub. L.
No. 91-452, title IX, §904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970). The statute contains no words
of limitation that confine its directive to parts of title IX. It clearly applies to
title IX as a whole. It is to be regretted that some judges are refusing to give'the
statute its intended effect.
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construction of RICO is one of a generous, rather than a parsimonious
-reading of its promise of new criminal and civil, remedies. The statute
was drafted from the perspective of the victim, not the perpetrator.
III. CRIMINAL RICO
Section 1963 "' provides criminal remedies for a violation of
RICO's standards. In the event of a criminal conviction, the violator
may "be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than
twenty years, or both." "' These penalties sometimes, but not always,
will .exceed those which could be imposed for two violations of the
incorporated offenses."' In addition to a fine and imprisonment, the
11'3. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976) provides:
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter
shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty
years, or both, and shall forfeit to the United States (1) any interest he
has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962, and (2) any interest
in, security of, claim against, or property or contractual right of any kind
affording a source of influence over, any enterprise which he has established,
operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation
of section 1962.
(b) In any action brought by the United States under this section, the
-district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to enter such
restraining orders or prohibitions, or to take such other actions, including,
but not limited to, the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, in
connection with any property or other interest subject to forfeiture under
this section, as it shall deem proper.
(c) Upon conviction of a person under this section, the court shall
authorize the Attorney General to seize all property or other interest
declared forfeited under this section upon such terms and conditions as the
court shall deem proper. If a property right or other interest is not
exercisable or transferable for value by the United States, it shall expire,
and shall not revert to the convicted person. All provisions of law relating
to the disposition of property, or the proceeds from the sale thereof, or
the remission or mitigation of forfeitures for violation of the customs laws,
and the compromise of claims and the award of compensation to informers
in respect of such forfeitures shall apply to forfeitures incurred, or alleged to
have been incurred, under the provisions of this section, insofar as applicable
.and not inconsistent with the provisions hereof. Such duties as are imposed
upon the collector of customs or any other person with respect to the dis-
position of property under the customs laws shall be performed under this
chapter by the Attorney General. The United States shall dispose of all
such property as soon as commercially feasible, making due provision for
the rights of innocent persons.
114. Id. § 1963(a). For the text of § 1963, see note 113 supra.
115. For example, a violation of 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1976) (unlawful payments to
a union representative) is a misdemeanor. 18 U.S.C. § 1(2) (1976) (less than
one-year is misdemeanor). When § 186 is used as a "racketeering act," the potential
penalty for a pattern of § 186 payments is raised to the felony level. 18 U.S.C.
§1(1) (1976) (more than one-year is felony). See, e.g., United States v. Scotto,
No. 80-1041 (2d Cir. 1980). On the other hand, murder is also a "racketeering
act." Murder is frequently punishable by life imprisonment or a death 'sentence.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1976) (murder punishable by death, life imprisonment, or
term of years). Nevertheless, under RICO, the penalty of imprisonment could not
exceed twenty years unless a separate proceeding was instituted under title X of the
Organized Crime Control Act (enhanced terms up to 25 years with appellate review
authorized for dangerous special offenders); as was the case in United States v.
DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 49 U.S.L.W. 4022 (U.S. Dec. 9,
1980) (No. 79-567) (title X appeal by prosecutor sustained against double jeopardy
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objections). Just as RICO had been, until recently, ignored by federal prosecutors
and remains largely unused by the plaintiff's bar, so, too, has title X remained
largely an unfilled promise. As the Supreme Court noted in its opinion in
DiFrancesco:
It was indicated at oral argument . . . that this is the first case in which
the United States specifically has sought review of a sentence under § 3576.
Inasmuch as the statute was enacted a decade ago, this fact might be said
to indicate either little use of the special offender statute by the United
States, or prosecutorial concern about its constitutionality or that federal
trial judges are imposing sufficiently severe sentences on special offenders
to make review unnecessary. No definitive explanation, however, has been
offered. An attempt on the part of this Court to explain the nonuse of
the statute would be speculation, and we shall not indulge in it.
Id. at 4025.
The Court also commented:
It is perhaps worth noting in passing, that §3576 represents a considered
legislative attempt to attack a specific problem in our criminal justice
system, that is, the tendency on the part of some trial judges "to mete out
light sentences in cases involving organized crime management personnel."
The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, Report by the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 203 (1967)
Section 3576 was Congress' response to that plea.
Id. at 4029.
The court need not have speculated. A comprehensive study had been done
of the failure of the Department of Justice to use title X. See GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFiCE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: WAR ON ORGANIZED CRIME FALTERING--FEDERAL
STRIKE FORCES NOT GETTING THE JOB DONE (Mar. 17, 1977). The 1977 Report
of the General Accounting Office concluded:
Five of the six strike forces reviewed had obtained no indictments under the
special offender provision and in the few cases that had been prosecuted,
only two resulted in convictions.
Attorneys-in-charge of the strike forces offered various reasons for not using
this provision more frequently including:
-Appropriate cases have not occurred.
-The provision has been attacked as unconstitutional.
-Many organized crime figures have previously been indicted but not
convicted and, therefore, cannot be prosecuted under the special
offender provision.
Id. at 29.
The 1977 Report also found 52% of the Strike Force convictions reviewed
resulted in no jail time and that a sentence of confinement of 2 years or less
occurred in 58%b of the convictions. Id. at 24. While 37% of the convictions were
for illegal gambling, the record, for obtaining jail time was not impressive if
attention was Solely focused on "high-echelon" figures, who, it might be expected,
would have received substantial time even for gambling convictions. An examina-
tion of 128 of 241 convictions revealed that 51% received no jail time or at least less
than 2 years in jail. Id. at 26. The Report noted: "The sentences imposed repre-
sented only a small fraction of the maximum sentence possible." Id. While there
is no current study of organized crime sentencing that is publicly available, Director
of the FBI, William H. Webster,. has told the Congress that the Bureau's efforts
in its organized crime program, representing 22% of its field agent time, are
resulting in about 632 convictions per year, 405 of which are in the racketeering
classification. Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies Approprialion for 1981: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Appropriations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1980) (testimony of
William H. Wcbster). Webster also indicated that 107 of the convictions "were
either associtcs or members of the largest organized crime groups operating in
this country." Id. at 91. Twenty per cent of its field agent time is classified as
srert in "RICO-Miscellaneous," 47% "RICO-Traditional" and 17% "RICO-Non-
Traditional." Id. at 84. There would seem to be, therefore, a number of organized
crime type prosecutions, the impact of which could be enhanced if title X proceedings
were routinely brought.
The constitutionality of title X has, moreover, been affirmed on issues touching
other than its appellate provisions. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 531 F.2d
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violator must forfeit "" to the United States any interest he has
acquired (all his ill-gotten gains) as well as any interest in an enter-
prise (his economic base) which affords him a source of power over
the enterprise involved in the violation of RICO."' The statute
authorizes the courts to enter restraining orders prior to conviction
326 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1967) (due process requirements satisfied
by standards to evaluate "dangerous offender" provision). Consequently, there
would seem to be, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
DiFrancesco, little reason to continue to neglect this "considered legislative attempt"
to control organized crime. For a comprehensive analysis of the rationale, legislative
history, and proper statutory construction of title X, see Amicus Curiae Brief, United
States v. Duardi, No. 75-1354 (8th Cir. 1975) reprinted in [1975] 18 CRIM. L. REP.
(BNA) 3001.
116. United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 809-13 (5th Cir. 1980), appeal
docketed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3803 (U.S. May 24, 1980) (No. 79-1898) (§ 1963(a) makes
forfeiture mandatory rather than discretionary) is well-reasoned and correctly decided.
But see United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100
S. Ct. 1312 (1980) (§ 1963(a) permits district court a certain amount of discretion
in avoiding draconian application of § 1963(a)). L'Hoste, not Huber, reflects what
Congress intended. See 1 MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 402-06.
117. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1)-(2) (1976). See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CRIMINAL DIVIsIoN, CRIMINAL FORFEITURES UNDER RICO AND THE CONTINUING
CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE STATUTES (1980). For example, a union official who breached
his trust would not only have to disgorge his ill-gotten gains, but he would also
have to give up his office. United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 992 (5th Cir.
1977). The forfeiture provisions have been upheld against constitutional objections
rooted in vagueness, United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1038 (4th Cir. 1980),
and cruel and unusual punishment, United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1085 (1980). They have also been held to be
consistent with the treason clause of the constitution. U.S. CONST. art. III, §3,
cl. 2; United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 140-41 (N.D. Ga. 1979). In
United States v. Marubeni America Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 769 (9th Cir. 1980),
however, the Ninth Circuit held that the only interests subject to forfeiture under
§ 1963(1) and (2) were those "in an enterprise." In so reading RICO, the court
ignored the statute's liberal construction clause, Pub. L. No. 91-452, title IX,
§904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970), and its Statement of Findings and Purpose, Pub. L.
No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970), and read into §1963(a)(1) the words "in enter-
prise" which plainly were not there. The court's construction of the subsection not
only violated the plain meaning of the statute, it also contradicted the intent of its
chief sponsor. See McClellan, supra note 55, at 141. ("Title IX attacks the problem
by providing a means of wholesale removal of organized crime from our organization,
prevention of their return, and, where possible, forfeiture of their ill-gotten gains").
The error of the court illustrates a common mistake. Unable to read the plain
words of the statute, see note 112 supra, resort is made to the legislative history.
The legislative history is then read as exhaustive, rather than as illustrative of the
meaning of the statute. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1969)
("in the enterprise"). This reading is correct, but incomplete. Other aspects of
the history are ignored. See, e.g., H.R. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 57, reprinted
in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4007-91 ("all property and interests as
broadly defined which are related to the violations"). Taking one purpose of a
provision as its only purpose, the plain meaning of the statute is narrowed based
on a negative pregnant from the legislative history, in contravention of the liberal
construction directive. The decision is clearly wrong and should not be followed
in the other circuits. See note 112 supra for a discussion of the liberal construction
directive. For similar erroneous holdings, see United States v. Mannino, Crim.
No. 79-744 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1980) ; United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134
(N.D. Ga. 1979) ; United States v. Meyers, 432 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Pa.), rev'd
on other grounds, sub nom. United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir.
1977). Appeals in the Second Circuit, United States v. Guiliano, No. 80-1291, and
the Fifth Circuit, United States v. Holt, No. 78-5260, raise the same issue. Hope-
fully, the reasoning of Marubeni will be rejected, and an opportunity for the
Supreme Court to resolve the question correctly will be afforded. For a detailed
critique, see 1 MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 37 8a-378jj. For a contrary view, see
Taylor, Forfeiture Under 18 U.S.C. §1963-RICO's Most Powerful Weapon, 17
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 379 (1980).
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to prevent the transfer of the property threatened with forfeiture.11
Subsection (c) prescribes that the Attorney General shall seize the
forfeited property "upon such terms and conditions as the court shall
deem proper." 119 It also provides that the provisions of the customs
laws dictate the procedure for disposing of the property." Finally,
subsection (c) states that "[t]he United States shall dispose of all
such property as soon as commercially feasible, making due provision
for the rights of innocent persons." 12
Criminal forfeiture had been largely unknown in American juris-
prudence."' Congress included these new forfeiture provisions to
break the economic power of organized crime as well as to punish
and deter offenders."2  Criminal forfeiture is based on personal guilt;
the rights of the government in the property derive from an in per-
sonam judgment against the offender.124 Civil forfeiture, on the
other hand, generally arises from a violation of customs, revenue, or
certain narcotics laws. It stems from a fiction that ascribes guilt
to the property, and the rights of the government derive from an in
rem judgment against the offending articles.' In civil forfeiture
proceedings, if the property is tainted, the rights of innocent third
parties in the property may be extinguished.' RICO has not carried
into the law of criminal forfeiture this objectionable feature of the
current law of civil forfeiture, as it gives extensive recognition to the
rights of innocent persons. Nevertheless, it does incorporate many
of the procedural rules for civil forfeiture under the customs laws
into its provisions. Consequently, there is a tension between the
customs laws that recognize almost no substantive rights in third
parties and subsection (c) that requires due provision for innocent
118. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (1976). Such restraining orders do not deny to a
defendant the presumption of innocence, United States v. Scalzotti, 408 F. Supp.
1014, 1015 (W.D. Pa. 1975), or the right to retain a counsel, United States v.
Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723, 725 (S.D. Cal. 1979), and they may be properly granted.
But see United States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 679, 683 (D. Md. 1976), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 1647 (1980). For a detailed discussion of tracing problems and pro-
cedures in the forfeiture area, see 1 MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 353-78.
119. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1976). See note 113 supra for the text of § 1963(c).
120. For a detailed discussion of disposition and remission, see 1 MATERIALS,
.rupra note 12, at 379-406.
121. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1976). For a detailed analysis of this provision, see
1 MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 388-90, 393-99.
122. For an excellent treatment of the history of criminal forfeitures in the
United States, see Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law-Banished At Last?
62 CORNELL L. Rxv. 768 (1977). See also 1 MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 296-352,
for an overview of forfeiture under RICO.
123. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969).
124. See 1 MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 296-352; Note, supra note 122, at 796.
125. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663
(1974).
126. Id. at 680-90.
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third parties in the disposition of forfeited property. RICO, for ex-
ample, gives the government two opposing duties: disposing of prop-
erty as soon as commercially feasible, and "making due provision for
the rights of innocent persons." 121 Many problems may arise from
governmental disposition of property. Because the government's pro-
prietary stake in forfeited goods is relatively unimportant in relation
to the primary goal of removing the criminal from his source of
power and denying him the benefit of any proceeds he may have
realized from his criminal activity, the policy of the profitable and
speedy disposition of property ought not be given such weight that it
would deprive innocent persons of their rights. 2 s
IV. CIVIL RICO
A. Plaintiff
Under section 1964,"2 the Attorney General ... or "any person
injured in his business or property" 1"1 may bring a civil suit in federal
court against the RICO offender. Equitable relief available in a civil
action under section 1962(a) includes divestiture of an interest in an
enterprise, restrictions on future activities or investments, and dissolu-
127. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1976). For the text of § 1963(c), see note 113 supra.
128. For an analysis of RICO forfeitures, see 1 MATERIALS, supra note 12,
at 296-406.
129. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976) provides in part:
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to
prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing
appropriate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to
divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing
reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person,
including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the
same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which
affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or re-
organization of any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of
innocent persons.
(b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section.
In any action brought by the United States under this section, the court
shall proceed as soon as practicable to the hearing and determination thereof.
Pending final determination thereof, the court may at any time enter such
restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other actions, including the
acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as it shall deem proper.
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate
United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he
sustains and cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
It is not necessary for a government action, United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d
1351 (7th Cir. 1974), or a private action, Conway v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines,
Inc., 487 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1980) to be preceded by a criminal conviction.
The civil provisions of RICO were modeled on antitrust law. S. REP. No.
617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1969). H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
56-60 reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4007-91. For an analysis
of antitrust law in the context of organized crime, see Note, Antitrust Enforcement
Against Organized Crime, 70 COLUM. L. Rxv. 307 (1970).
130. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) (1976). For the text of § 1964(b), see note 129 supra.
131. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976). For the text of §1964(c), see note 129 supra.
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tion or reorganization of an enterprise. 18 2  In a suit brought by a
private party, the plaintiff may obtain not only general equitable
relief, but treble damages and costs, including a reasonable attorney's
fee. 
8 3
Civil suits may be brought in proper cases as class actions under
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 34 In general, the
class action device saves the time and expense of the parties and the
courts by combining multiple suits into a single action.8 It also
encourages claimants to litigate claims too small for individual suits.8 "
132. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1976). For the text of § 1964(a), see note 129 supra.
See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 80-83 (1969). The list of remedies is
not "exhaustive." H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 57, reprinted in [1970]
U.S. CODE: CONG. & AD. NEWS 4007-91. For an analysis of private actions for
injunctive relief under RICO, see 3 MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 1332-76.
133. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) & (c) (1976). A Congressional grant of the right
to sue in the absence of statutory limitations, conveys the availability of all necessary
and appropriate relief. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S.
229, 239 (1969) ; Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946). Significantly, the treble
damage clause of § 1964(c) is preceded by "and" and not "to." See National R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974)
(grant of right in one form implies denial of right in another). Consequently, the
availability of comprehensive civil relief should prove of particular significance, for
example, in the area of government fraud at the state and local level. States have
been held to be "persons" under the Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731
(1914), on which § 1964(c) was modeled. Where fraud is involved, a state would
have the right to sue for treble damages and other forms of relief, including the
rescission of the illegal contracts. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d
1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971) (recovery of $82 million). Note,
too, that under federal rules, well settled since the Tea Pot Dome scandals, suit by
public bodies need not involve quantum meruit accounting. Pan Am. Petroleum
and Transp. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 456, 509 (1927); K & R Eng'r Co. v.
United States, 616 F.2d 469, 476-77 (Ct. Cl. 1980). A similar rule also exists in
the jurisprudence of some states. See, e.g., S. T. Grand, Inc. v. City of New York,
32 N.Y.2d 300, 344 N.Y.S.2d 938, 298 N.E.2d 105 (1973). Recovery in such actions
could be substantial, having the impact of taking the profit out of government fraud,
surely one of the most important of RICO's goals. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 78 (1969) (inadequacy of present system calls for attack on subversion of
economic power). For example, since the conviction of the Marubeni America
Corporation and Hitachi Cable, Ltd., in United States v. Marubeni America Corp.,
611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980), the City of Anchorage has had under consideration a
civil RICO action. Relief could include treble damage for the amount of the bribes
($330,000 X 3 = $990,000) plus rescission of $8.8 million in cable contracts, without
having to account for the cable received, as well as costs and attorneys' fees. See
Anchorage Eyes Civil Suit Over Bribery, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 24, 1980, at 5, col. 1.
The city would also be able to take advantage of the federal conviction for the
purposes of collateral estoppel. See note 187 infra and accompanying text for a
discussion of the "mutuality" requirement in the collateral estoppel context. See
also Maryland v. Buzz Berg Wrecking Co., 496 F. Supp. 245 (D. Md. 1980) (suit
growing out of United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir. 1980)) ; N.Y.
Times, Jan. 28, 1981, § 2, at 3, col. 1 (suit for fraud by Suffolk County under RICO
for rescission and $260 million in damages).
134. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. While this issue is yet to be litigated, there is at
least one decision that intimates class actions are permissible under RICO. See
Hines v. City Fin. Co. of Eastover, Inc., 474 F.2d 430, 431 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
There is no reason to believe that RICO class actions will not be permitted. See 2
MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 894-973.
135. ILL. INST. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., CLASS ACTIONS §2.4, at 2-8
(1974). See also 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 1751, at 505 (1970).
136. Shields v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 442, 445 (D. Ariz. 1972). See also
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 186 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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RICO class actions would greatly deter crime 17 because of their
geometrically increased damage awards; therefore, they should be
encouraged.
B. Venue and Process
RICO civil suits must be brought in accordance with the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. 8 " RICO does, however, include spe-
cial procedural rules. Section 1965 (a) provides that a civil action
may be instituted where the defendant "resides, is found, has an
agent, or transacts his affairs." 131 In such actions, the court has
personal jurisdiction over the defendant and venue is proper. 14° Sec-
tion 1965(b) is one of the most potentially far-reaching procedural
devices of the RICO statute.'41 It authorizes the court, if the inter-
ests of justice require, to serve and join parties over whom the court
would not ordinarily have personal jurisdiction and where venue
would normally be improper. The suit need only be brought in a
proper court for at least one defendant. Section 1965(b) then au-
thorizes "other parties" to be joined and brought before the court;
it does not authorize initiating a suit in what would otherwise be an
Recently, however, this incentive has been eroded in the federal courts. See Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) ; Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414
U.S. 291 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 384 U.S. 332 (1969); Becker, Introduction:
Use and Abuse of Class Actions Under Amended Rule 23, Nw. U.L. REv. 991, 992
(1974) (as a result of the decisions in Zahn and Snyder, use of class actions in
diversity cases has diminished to the point of minor significance) ; Comment, Zahn
v. International Paper: Taking the Action Out of Class Action, or Can Zahn Be
Avoided, 12 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 208 (1974).
137. One commentator has stated: "It is precisely because the class action
deters the robber barons from plundering the poor that it has been hailed as a
very important supplement to law enforcement." Comment, Manageability of Notice
and Damage Calculation in Consumer Class Actions, 70 MicH. L. REV. 338, 338
(1971) (quoting letter from A. Pomeranz to Financial Editor, N.Y. Times, Apr.
25, 1971, § 3, at 22, col. 8). See also King v. Vesco, 342 F. Supp. 120, 121 (N.D.
Cal. 1972) (RICO private actions are designed to supplement prosecutions by Dep't
of Justice to combat attempts by organized crime to takeover legitimate businesses).
138. See 2 MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 607-815.
139. 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (a) (1976) provides: "Any civil action or proceeding
under this chapter against any person may be instituted in the district court of the
United States for any district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent,
or transacts his affairs."
140. Under the parallel antitrust statute, 15 U.S.C. §22 (1976), venue and per-
sonal jurisdiction are virtually congruent. See, e.g., Pacific Tobacco Corp. v. Ameri-
can Tobacco Corp., 338 F. Supp. 842, 844 (D. Or. 1972).
141. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) (1976) provides:
In any action under section 1964 of this chapter in any district court
of the United States in which it is shown that the ends of justice require
that other parties residing in any other district be brought before the court,
the court may cause such parties to be summoned, and process for that




improper court.142 Section 1965(c) 148 deals with subpoenas of wit-
nesses in civil actions brought by the United States. Subpoenas
may be served in any judicial district. If the witness lives in another
district at a place more than one hunderd miles from the court, how-
ever, a subpoena will be issued only after approval by the judge upon
a showing of good cause. Under section 1965 (d) ,1 all other process
may be served wherever the person "resides, is found, has an agent,
or transacts his affairs." 141
C. Standing
Section 1964(c) confers the right to sue on "[a]ny person in-
jured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962 of this chapter . . . ." "" It is modeled after, but is not identical
to, section 4 of the Clayton Act, which creates a private treble dam-
age action for "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
... ,, 147 Although both statutes are broadly worded and on their
face appear to create a private cause of action for anyone who
can prove that an injury to his "business or property" was caused
by a violation of either section 1962 or the antitrust laws, the federal
courts have severely limited the number of private plaintiffs in the anti-
trust field through the enforcement of stringent "standing" require-
ments. 14  To establish standing, an antitrust plaintiff must generally
142. While this section was modeled on antitrust law, it is broader. 15 U.S.C.
§§5, 10 & 25 (1976) are limited to government suits; they do not apply to private
suits. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 467 (1945). This provision,
however, applies to "any action under section 1964," which includes both govern-
mental and private actions. See Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F.
Supp. 1278, 1282 n.8 (D. Del. 1978).
143. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(c) (1976) provides:
In any civil or criminal action or proceeding instituted by the United
States under this chapter in the district court of the United States for
any judicial district, subpenas issued by such court to compel the attendance
of witnesses may be served in any other judicial district, except that in
any civil action or proceeding no such subpena shall be issued for service
upon any individual who resides in another district at a place more than
one hundred miles from the place at which such court is held without ap-
proval given by a judge of such court upon a showing of good cause.
144. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d) (1976) provides: "All other process in any action or
proceeding under this chapter may be served on any person in any judicial district
in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs."
145. Id. On the scope of this provision, see 1 MATERIALS, supra note 12, at
654-59. Service of process on defendants must be distinguished from service of
process on witnesses. Government suits must be distinguished from private suits.
146. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976). For the text of § 1964(c), see note 129 supra.
See 1 MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 428-532, for a detailed analysis of the character
of a treble damage action.
147. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
148. See 1 MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 533-73 for an analysis of standing rules
and the RICO treble damages action.
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show two elements: first, an injury to his "business or property";
and second, that his injury was "by reason of" a violation of the
antitrust laws. 49  The courts have interpreted "business" in its
ordinary sense.' It encompasses practically all industrial and com-
merical enterprises, 5 ' including those of nonprofit plaintiffs 152 and
labor unions. 55 The second term, "property," has also been held to
have a "naturally broad and inclusive meaning." 154 It is wider in
scope and more extensive than the word "business." ' Property
includes, for example, expenditures to defend against patent infringe-
ment suits and a labor union's opportunity to obtain members. 5 6
The interest of the taxpayer or citizen, however, is not considered
business or property.1 57  Moreover, personal injuries and loss of
consortium are not injuries to property under section 4.15' The "by
reason of" language of section 4 has been held to require a causal re-
lationship between the antitrust violation and the plaintiff's injury.
This concept is similar to the proximate cause theory in torts.15 9
Nevertheless, under section 4 legal causation or proximate cause has
been held to require not only "but for" causation but a legally cog-
nizable relationship between the plaintiff and defendant.0 0 As a
result, it has been held that only direct injury is compensable; indi-
rect injury has been thought to be outside of the scope of the provisions
of the antitrust law.' 6 ' The circuit courts of appeal have devised a
number of different tests for directness, each of which reflects a dif-
149. See, e.g., Farnell v. Albuquerque Publishing Co., 589 F.2d 497, 500 (10th
Cir. 1978).
150. See, e.g., Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1942).
151. Compare Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972) (words
"business" or "property" refer to "commercial interests or enterprises") with Reiter
v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 341 (1979) (phrase "commercial interests or en-
terprises" read in context in no sense suggests that only injuries to a business entity
will grant standing to an antitrust plaintiff).
152. Compare Friends of Animals, Inc. v. American Veterinary Medical Ass'n,
310 F. Supp. 1016, 1018 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (non-profit corporation engaged in re-
ducing number of unwanted cats and dogs is engaged in "trade or commerce")
with Buckley Towers Condominium, Inc. v. Buchwald, 533 F.2d 934, 938 (5th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977) (non-profit condominium corporation has
no commercial interests or enterprises in the strict sense).
153. See Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1976).
154. Reiter v. Sonotone, 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979).
155. Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 231 F. Supp. 72, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
156. See International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v. United Contractors
Ass'n, 483 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1973), modified on other grounds, 494 F.2d 1353
(3d Cir. 1974) (en banc).
157. Cosentino v. Carver-Greenfield Corp., 433 F.2d 1274 (8th Cir. 1970).
158. Hamman v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 420, 432 (D. Mont. 1967), appeal
dismissed, 399 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1968).
159. See W. PRossa, LAW OF TORTS §§ 41-43, at 236-70 (4th ed. 1971).
160. See Pollock, The "Injury" and "Causation" Elements of a Treble Damage




ferent theory of causation. 62 In general, the tests can be put into
three categories: first, the older and stricter "direct-injury" test;
second, the more flexible "target-area" test; and third, the most
recent "zone of interests" test.'63 Each of these tests sharply limits
the number of plaintiffs who may bring antitrust suits.
Although the language of RICO was taken from the antitrust
law, the policies behind the antitrust standing rules make the rules
generally inapplicable to RICO. As antitrust law is drawn upon in
the interpretation of RICO, policy as well as statutory language
should govern how the one body of law is given effect in a new
area. Standing is often denied to antitrust plaintiffs, it is said, be-
cause the recoveries sought would be duplicative,'6 4 ruinous, 65 specu-
lative, "'66 or windfall.'6 To ruin an antitrust defendant-usually a
legitimate businessman engaging in something other than predatory
conduct-would generally lessen competition and increase concentra-
tion in that particular industry. 6 RICO, on the other hand, is
more concerned with compensating victims and making them whole
than in maintaining a competitive economy where the "competitive
acts" are racketeering in character. The main objective is to control
criminal activity. Some of the activity may be predatory, violent,
and rooted in fraud, but none of it can be said to have any claim of
justification in sound social policy. There are, in short, few counter-
vailing reasons to lessen the impact of remedies on RICO defendants
as there might be in a typical antitrust case. Indeed, putting at least
some types of defendants out of business would generally further the
goals of RICO.
Sometimes the standing requirements of antitrust law have been
justified on the ground that opening the doors to more suits would
put too much of an administrative burden on the courts. 69 Such a
situation is not imminent under RICO. Clearly, private RICO actions
have not represented an administrative burden on the courts. Only
162. See Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1148 (6th Cir. 1975);
1 MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 552-69.
163. See 1 MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 552-69 for a more detailed discussion
of the tests for directness.
164. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262-64 (1972).
165. See Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1975).
166. Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92, 97 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 935 (1976).
167. Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
168. Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Anti-Trust Standing,
86 YALE L.J. 809, 850 (1977).
169. The Supreme Court noted this consideration in Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 741 (1977). See Note, Scaling the Illinois Brick Wall: The
Future of Indirect Purchasers in Antitrust Litigation, 63 CORNELL L. Rav. 309
(1978).
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a handful of cases have been brought in more than a decade. Ap-
parently the RICO plaintiff needs more, not less, incentive to sue.
In any event, the question of court burden is one that ought to be
addressed by Congress and not by the courts, especially when Con-
gress has mandated that the courts construe the statute liberally to
effectuate its remedial purposes.' 70
D. Discovery
Private plaintiffs bringing a RICO treble damage action have
broad discovery rights under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.17'
The Rules authorize discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action.' 2 One
limitation on the scope of discovery that may play an important role
in RICO litigation is the privilege against self-incrimination.' 7" The
privilege applies to facts which directly 171 or indirectly 175 involve
criminal liability. 7 Any information within the privilege is pre-
cluded from discovery. 177  Because, under RICO, facts that poten-
tially establish civil liability may also potentially establish criminal
liability, 78 RICO defendants may be expected to assert the privilege
170. The soundness of this policy argument even in the antitrust field is not
clear in light of Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979), in which the court
held that concern over crowded dockets could not be a "controlling consideration"
in a section 4 standing determination. Id. at 344.
171. Important federal discovery provisions include those authorizing a party
to depose other parties and witnesses, FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a), to propound written
interrogatories to other parties, FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a), and to compel production
of relevant documents, FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a). See 2 MATERIALS, supra note 12,
at 816-57.
172. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
173. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The amendment provides that "no person . . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Id. Al-
though the privilege has no obvious application to civil pretrial discovery, it is a
constitutionally guaranteed right in civil proceedings. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266
U.S. 34, 40 (1924) (the privilege applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings,
wherever the answer might tend to subject a party or witness to criminal respon-
sibility). See also United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1970); Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892) for the proposition that the privilege protects
witnesses as well as accused parties.
174. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2254 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
175. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
176. If the information sought would be only a "link in the chain" of evidence
needed for criminal prosecution, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1964) ; Hoff-
man v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951), or would provide leads to other
incriminating evidence, see Note, Use of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
in Civil Litigation, 52 VA. L. REv. 322, 324-25 (1966), then the information is held
within the privilege and will be precluded from discovery in a civil action. 8 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, Federal Practice and Procedure §2018, at 140 (1970).
See also DeVita v. Sills, 422 F.2d 1172, 1178 (3d Cir. 1970) (party can object to
discovery directed against him when answers might incriminate him in pending
criminal case).
177. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
178. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1964 (1976).
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against self-incrimination during pretrial discovery." 9  As a result,
many plaintiffs may be frustrated in their effort to discover the de-
fendant's misconduct, particularly when a parallel criminal investiga-
tion or prosecution is under way."" If a stay is granted, discovery
may be delayed until the termination of the criminal proceedings. 8 '
The most effective alternative in such a case may well be a protective
order under Rule 26(c)."2 A protective order would allow discovery
to go forward but would insure that information is revealed only for
the use of parties to the action.1
3
E. Collateral Estoppel
Under section 1964(d) a final judgment in favor of the United
States in a criminal proceeding has a collateral estoppel effect on the
defendant in a subsequent civil proceeding brought by the govern-
ment." 4 The language of section 1964, however, provides for col-
179. See generally 8 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2257 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) ;
Comment, Federal Discovery in Concurrent Criminal and Civil Proceedings, 52
TUL. L. REv. 769 (1978).
180. See generally Pickholtz, The Expanding World of Parallel Proceedings,
53 TEMP. L.Q. 1100 (1980).
181. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buzz Berg Wrecking Co., 496 F. Supp. 245, 249
(D. Md. 1980). Should such a stay be granted, however, an unacceptable burden
may be placed on the civil plaintiff's right to a prompt and fair disposition of his
case. Comment, supra note 179, at 781. See generally United States v. Simon, 373
F.2d 649 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Simon v. Wharton, 389 U.S. 425
(1967). In addition, valuable evidence may be lost as a result of the delay. Com-
ment, supra note 179, at 788. See Texaco, Inc. v. Borda, 383 F.2d 607, 609 (3d
Cir. 1967). Faced with the prospects of expensive, time-consuming delay and
possible loss of evidence, potential plaintiffs may be deterred from ever asserting
their rights. Comment, supra note 179, at 788. Such a result is inconsistent with the
right of individuals to be compensated for their damages, id., and reduces the utility
found in the public policy of relying on private suits as a means of enforcing the
organized crime laws. Id. Compare Comment, supra note 179, at 788 (in balancing
rights of all parties in concurrent antitrust civil and criminal proceedings, there is
a possibility of infringing upon rights of civil plaintiffs to be compensated and of con-
travening public policy of relying on private suits as a means of enforcing antitrust
laws) with Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751 (1947)
(antitrust private remedies and private self-interest provide strong and reliable
motive for enforcement, relieve government of cost of enforcement, and arm injured
persons with private means of retribution). The undesirability of this result is
only partially offset by the civil plaintiff's use of a conviction to establish liability.
See notes 184-95 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of collateral estoppel.
182. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
183. See Donnici, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in. Civil Pre-Trial
Discovery: The Use of Protective Orders to Avoid Constitutional Issues, "3 U.S.F.
L. REv. 12 (1968). The author notes that "while the rule [2 6(c)] is silent as to
any intended use to protect a party from self-incrimination, it is obvious that pro-
tective orders can be so adapted." Id. at 16. Even if the government should learn
of the information, it could be argued that utilizing such knowledge either as
evidence or investigatory leads would be prohibited under Garrity v. New Jersey,
385 U.S. 493 (1967). See Donnici, supra, at 21.
184. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(d) (1976) provides:
A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the United States in
any criminal proceeding brought by the United States under this chapter
shall estop the defendant from denying the essential allegations of the crim-
inal offense in any subsequent civil proceedings brought by the United States.
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lateral estoppel only in a government action; it does not mention
its use by private parties. This omission was not the result of a
policy decision to bar private parties' use of collateral estoppel, but
rather of an understanding of the requirements of mutuality at the
time RICO was drafted. When the subsequent civil action is brought
by a private individual, the preclusion effect of the prior criminal
prosecution would be governed not by RICO, but by general prin-
ciples.1 5  Generally, the courts have required mutuality and identity
of parties.' Nevertheless, the "mutuality" requirement, in which
collateral estoppel applies only when both parties are bound by the
prior judgment, has been significantly modified in the past thirty-five
years.
In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 187 the Supreme Court abol-
ished the mutuality requirement in the context of a private civil dam-
age action subsequent to a government equitable proceeding.' In
185. See 2 MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 859-93 for a more detailed discussion of
the use of a prior criminal judgment for collateral estoppel purposes.
186. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Founda-
tion, 402 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1971).
187. 439 U.S. 322 (1979). See, Note, Mutuality of Estoppel and the Seventh
Amendment: The Effect of Parklane Hosiery, 64 Co.NELL L. REv. 1002 (1979) and
Note, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 1221 (1979) for a discussion of Parklane.
188. 439 U.S. at 322. The Court in Parklane outlined four factors for con-
sideration before applying offensive collateral estoppel: (1) the party seeking to
use collateral estoppel could not have joined the previous action; (2) the party
against whom collateral estoppel would apply had incentive to fully litigate the
issue in the prior action; (3) there have been no inconsistent rulings on the issue
in prior actions; and (4) there are no new procedural opportunities available to the
precluded party in the second action or, if there are, they are not likely to cause a
result different from that of the first action. Id. at 331-32.
In the RICO situation, the first three factors are satisfied. The private plaintiff
could not have joined the prior criminal prosecution; the defendant in the prior
criminal case had the incentive to litigate the issue fully because his liberty or
property was at stake; and the inconsistent rulings factor has to be decided on a
case-by-case basis. Generally, one would expect only one prior criminal prosecution
to be the basis of the estoppel; therefore, no inconsistency would exist. The fourth
Parklane factor presents minimal problems in the RICO context, since there would
be no new procedural opportunities available to the precluded party in the second
action, or if there should be, they are not likely to cause a result different from that
of the first action. As a general rule, criminal defendants have limited discovery
rights, while civil parties have virtually unlimited discovery rights. See FEn. R.
Cirv. P. 26-37. Consequently, an argument could be made that use of collateral
estoppel would unfairly deprive a prior criminal defendant of the opportunity to
acquire evidence on a particular issue in the civil case. There are several reasons
why this consideration should not prevent the offensive use of collateral estoppel in
the criminal to civil context. United States v. Podell, 572 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1978)
(criminal conviction by guilty plea constitutes estoppel in favor of United States in
subsequent civil proceeding for money retained from illegal activity). Cf. S. T.
Grand, Inc. v. City of New York, 32 N.Y.2d 300, 344 N.Y.S.2d 938, 298 N.E.2d 105
(1973) (preclusion in state action for rescission based on federal bribery conviction).
First, the government has to prove the issue in dispute beyond a reasonable doubt
in the prior criminal case. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). To defeat the
government, the defendant has only to raise a reasonable doubt. In addition, while
pretrial discovery is limited in a criminal prosecution, there is a broad duty on
prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427
U.S. 97 (1976) ; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Note, The Prosecutor's
Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136 (1964).
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SEC v. Everest Management Corp.,"8 9 one of the few cases to date
applying Parklane to the criminal-civil setting, the court held that
there was no requirement of mutuality when "the party against whom
the estoppel is asserted . . . was afforded a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the identical issue in the prior [criminal] proceeding." "9
Before Parklane, several federal courts considered the issue of the
use of collateral estoppel by a person not a party to the previous
proceeding against the criminal defendant in the prior action. Gen-
erally, the courts allowed offensive as well as defensive use of col-
lateral estoppel.' Federal courts have given collateral estoppel effect
to guilty verdicts 192 and pleas of guilty, 193 but not to a plea of nolo
contendere 194 or an acquittal.' 95  Consequently, in light of the federal
practice before Parklane as well as the reasoning of Parklane, it seems
clear that a third party will be permitted to make use of a prior verdict
in a criminal prosecution against the defendant in a subsequent civil
action under RICO.
Consequently, it is unlikely that the new party would have an undue advantage over
the defendant sufficient to bar all offensive use of prior criminal judgments.
189. 466 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
190. Id. at 172 n.6 (emphasis added).
191. Cases supporting offensive use: SEC v. Kelly, Andrews & Bradley, Inc.,
385 F. Supp. 948, 954-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (prior criminal defendant collaterally
estopped from denying price manipulation conspiracy in subsequent civil action by
SEC); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Walburn, 378 F. Supp. 860, 866-68 (D.D.C. 1974)
(insurance company can use collateral estoppel to acquire summary judgment on
issue of malice in civil suit against defendant convicted of second-degree murder).
Cases supporting defensive use: McNally v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 532 F.2d 69,
76 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976) (defendant newspaper, in a civil
action brought by convicted air hijacker, could use collateral estoppel against
hijacker on issue of fair trial) ; Brazzell v. Adams, 493 F.2d 489, 490 (5th Cir.
1974) (state police agents, defendants in civil rights suit brought by convicted
narcotics dealer, could use collateral estoppel as to issue of sale of heroin) ; Willard v.
United States, 422 F.2d 810, 811 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 913 (1970) (FBI
agents can use finding of no abuse against prior criminal defendant's action for
damages).
192. Williams v. Liberty, 461 F.2d 325, 327 (7th Cir. 1972); SEC v. Everest
Management Corp., 466 F. Supp. 167, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ; Travelers Indem. Co.
v. Walburn, 378 F. Supp. 860, 865 (D.D.C. 1974). Cf. Emich Motors Corp. v.
General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 568 (1951) (conviction is only prima facie
evidence because of Clayton Act § 5).
193. Ivers v. United States, 581 F.2d 1362, 1367 (9th Cir. 1978) ; United
States v. Podell, 572 F.2d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1978) ; Brazzell v. Adams, 493 F.2d 489,
490 (5th Cir. 1974).
194. Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451, 455 (1926); United States v.
Brzoticky, 588 F.2d 773, 776 (10th Cir. 1978) ; United States v. Dorman, 496 F.2d
438, 440 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 945 (1974).
195. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232,
235 (1972) ; Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938) ; Tomlinson v.
Lefkowitz, 334 F.2d 262, 264 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 962 (1965);
SEC v. Everest Management Corp., 466 F. Supp. 167, 174 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
See 1B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.418[1], at 2703-04 (2d ed. 1974). An
acquittal might have preclusive effect if based on an affirmative defense proved by a
preponderance of the evidence. Vestal & Coughenout, Preclusion/Res Judicata
Variables: Criminal Prosecutions, 19 VAND. L. REv. 683, 702-03 (1966).
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F. Remedies
The civil remedies available in a private civil suit 196 would in-
clude not only general equitable relief, including injunctive relief, 97
but also treble damages and a reasonable attorney's fee.'
G. Statute of Limitations
When a federal statute creates a federal cause of action but
specifies no particular statute of limitations, the federal courts usually
apply the nearest analogous state statute of limitations.'99 The fed-
eral courts applied this rule in the antitrust area until 1955 at which
time Congress stepped in to remedy the confusion that had resulted.2"
RICO does not include a specific statute of limitations. Apart from
questions of fraud in the concealment,2"' one of the most important and
as yet unsettled issues in private civil actions will be the determina-
tion of which statute of limitations to apply. The question is exceed-
ingly complex,20 2 but the best approach would seem to be to apply
the nearest analogous federal statute. °3 This approach would pro-
mote clarity, predictability, and uniformity, and it would avoid defeat-
ing the remedial purposes of RICO by having its application encum-
bered by an unworkable body of law on the question of which state
statute of limitations to apply to the wide range of actions that might
be brought under it.
196. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976). See note 129 supra for the text of § 1964(c).
197. See 1 MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 407-27. The Senate bill sent to the
House, S. 30, S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1-32 (1969), did not include a
private right of action for damages. Id. title IX, § 1964. The final House version,
S. 30, H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, 15-21 reprinted in [1970] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4007-91, included the private action to sue and to recover
treble damages plus costs and attorney's fee. Id. § 1964(c). In floor debate,
Congressman Sam Steiger offered an amendment to clarify the scope and procedure
to be followed in the private action, 116 CONG. REc. 35346 (1970), and, even though
he later withdrew the amendment, id. at 35347, he made it clear that he felt the
authorization for the private injunctive action existed in the bill and that the
amendment was merely to clarify the procedure. Id. at 35346-47.
198. See 2 MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 574-606.
199. See, e.g., Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203
U.S. 390 (1906).
200. Congress remedied the situation by enacting a statute of limitation of
four years with a suspension for pending criminal cases. 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1976).
201. See 2 MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 1096-1144.
202. See 2 MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 974-1095. Not only is the question
exceedingly complex, but as decisions are rendered, the results achieved are very
diverse.
203. See McAllister v. Magnolia Petro. Co., 357 U.S. 221, 227-30 (1958)
(Brennan, J., concurring). But see Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co.,
495 F. Supp. 1321, 1324 n.4 (E.D. La. 1980) (Louisiana statute applied to RICO
action). Because Ingram does not represent a full consideration of the unique





The history of the first ten years of RICO has been largely taken
up with criminal prosecutions. The Department of Justice moved
slowly to implement the 1970 Act in the criminal context. RICO's
promise in the civil area is as yet almost wholly unrealized. Only
in recent years have prosecutors begun to see the benefits that may
be gained by its use. Like the Department of Justice, the private
victim has not yet begun to take advantage of RICO's promise in
the civil area. Nevertheless, as more criminal prosecutions are
brought, it may be expected that the plaintiffs' bar will learn that
RICO offers important legal avenues of recovery for victims of crime.
When that happens, RICO, unlike conspiracy law, may well gain
good repute among another segment of the bar. Like antitrust law,
RICO will not be seen as merely another tool in the hands of the
prosecution, but as a valuable effort by the legislature to launch a
broad-based attack on the special challenge of group crime by focusing
not only on criminal sanctions imposed on individuals but also on
civil relief for victims. If that promise is realized, those of us who
had a hand in designing and drafting RICO will know that we not
only tried to do our best, but that we accomplished an important
aspect of our goal. As Newsweek observed after it reviewed the most
prominent of the more than two hundred RICO prosecutions that
have been brought to date and listened to the complaints of the defense
bar: "Whatever its weaknesses, RICO gives the government an effec-
tive threat against sophisticated crime . . . . At least for a while,
for white-collar criminals as well as gangsters, RICO appears to be
evening up the odds." 204
204. RICO: The Enforcer, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 20, 1979, at 82, col. 3. It seems,
too, that RICO is serving as a model for state legislation. See, ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-2312 to 13-2315 (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§943.461 to 943.465 (Supp.
1980); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-3401 to 26-3408 (1975 & Supp. 1980); HAWAII REV.
STAT. §§ 842-1 to 842-12 (1976) ; IND. CODE ANN. tit. 35, §§ 45-6-1 & 45-6-2 (Burns
Supp. 1980) ; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 911 (1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-15-1 to 7-15-11
(Supp. 1980). For an analysis of these statutes as well as proposed legislation in
New Jersey, California, and Massachusetts, see 3 MATERIALS, supra note 12, at
1588-668. The state RICO statutes have been well received in the courts. Compare
Aztec Motel v. Faircloth, 251 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1971) (civil statute aimed at
organized crime held vague) with Morehead v. State, 383 So. 2d 629, 630-31 (Fla.
1980) (Florida RICO "pattern" held not vague nor unconstitutionally overbroad as
applied).
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